Mississippi State University

Scholars Junction
Theses and Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

12-10-2005

An Investigation Of Firms' Earnings Management Practices
Around Product Recalls
Zeeshan Ahmed

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td

Recommended Citation
Ahmed, Zeeshan, "An Investigation Of Firms' Earnings Management Practices Around Product Recalls"
(2005). Theses and Dissertations. 578.
https://scholarsjunction.msstate.edu/td/578

This Dissertation - Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at
Scholars Junction. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of
Scholars Junction. For more information, please contact scholcomm@msstate.libanswers.com.

AN INVESTIGATION OF FIRMS’ EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
AROUND PRODUCT RECALLS

By
Zeeshan Ahmed

A Dissertation
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Business Administration
in the Department of Finance and Economics
Mississippi State, Mississippi
December 2005

Copyright by
Zeeshan Ahmed
2005

AN INVESTIGATION OF FIRMS’ EARNINGS MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
AROUND PRODUCT RECALLS

By
Zeeshan Ahmed
Approved:

Theodor Kohers
Professor Emeritus of Finance
and International Business
(Director of Dissertation)

Larry White
Associate Professor of Finance
(Committee Member)

Wayne Kelly
Associate Professor of Finance
(Committee Member)

Randall Campbell
Assistant Professor of Economics
(Committee Member)

Alireza Tahai
Professor of Quantitative Analysis
(Committee Member)

Barbara Spencer
Director of Graduate Studies in
the College of Business and Industry

Sara M. Freedman
Dean of the College of Business and
Industry

Name: Zeeshan Ahmed
Date of Degree: December 10, 2005
Institution: Mississippi State University
Major Field: Business Administration (Finance)
Major Professor: Dr. Theodor Kohers
Title of Study: AN INVESTIGATION OF FIRMS’ EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
PRACTICES AROUND PRODUCT RECALLS
Pages in Study: 111
Candidate for Degree of Ph.D. in Business Administration (Finance)

This study investigates the earnings management practices of firms around
product recalls. In recent years, the management of earnings around firm-specific
events has received considerable attention in the finance and accounting literature. New
equity issues, mergers and acquisitions, share repurchases, and management buyouts are
some events around which at least some firms have been shown to manage their
earnings to achieve managements’ objectives. Product recalls offer yet another
interesting occasion when managers have incentives to cover up the true financial
performance of their firms and mislead investors.
In order to determine whether firms announcing product recalls manage earnings
more aggressively than non-announcing firms, this study employs the cross-sectional
version of the modified Jones (1991) model, as adapted by Teoh, Welch, and Wong

(1998 a and b). In order to address the misspecification concern of the model,
especially in the context of a performance-related event like product recall, we suggest a
modification in the model. We show that the proposed change in the model not only
better controls for event-specific working capital changes around recalls, it also
increases the explanatory power of the model. Overall, our results suggest that
managers tend to manage earnings upwards in quarters immediately preceding and
following the recall announcement quarter. We also find weak evidence of downward
earnings management in the quarter of recall. These results are in line with the
predictions of theoretical models and the findings of past empirical studies in earnings
management. The results of our research have important implications for investors and
regulators.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The topic of corporate earnings management has not only generated a great deal
of media attention but it also has become a source of serious concern to regulators and
policy makers. In the wake of the events that shook investors’ confidence in the
American financial reporting system in late 2001 and early 2002, the earnings
management practices of firms have come under fire by shareholders groups,
institutional investors and the financial press alike. To some extent, regulators have
responded by proposing and enacting new rules and regulations.1 Likewise, accounting
and financial researchers are increasingly probing into this topic.
Although researchers started documenting evidence of earnings management
much before the recent corporate scandals, these events have aroused a renewed and
invigorated campaign among academic researchers to develop and improve models to
detect earnings management and apply those models to determine the variables
associated with such practice.2 One stream of research within the earnings management

1

For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which President George W. Bush
dubbed as “the most far-reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of
Franklin D. Roosevelt”.
2

Leading scholarly journals like Accounting Horizons and The Accounting Review
published special issues devoted exclusively to ‘Earnings Management’ and ‘Earnings Quality’.
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-2literature focuses on examining earnings management practices around certain firmspecific events (e.g., management buyouts (see Perry and William (1994)), IPOs and
SEOs (see Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998 a and b)), mergers and acquisitions (see
Erickson and Wang (1999))). The general purpose of this line of research is to
investigate whether firms announcing these events manage earnings around them.
Furthermore, these studies relate the abnormal returns observed in the announcement
window to the degree of earnings management extant at the time of announcement.
Most of these studies argue that firms have strong incentives to engage in earnings
management around the specified corporate events and subsequently document the
evidence that the firms not only engage in more earnings management, but the market
reaction to these events is also significantly related to the managed component in
earnings. Following the aforementioned strand of research, this study examines
earnings management around another significant but relatively neglected event –
product recalls.
Product recalls are actions taken by a manufacturer or distributor to remove a
product from the market. A recall is initiated when there is reason to believe that the
product may pose a safety hazard to product users or may simply be unreliable or unfit
for use. Most recalls are voluntary in nature, but at times they may be requested or even
enforced by the regulatory authority overseeing the product class in question. Although
product recall announcements are pervasive across most industries and types of
manufacturing firms, some industries have a far greater frequency of recalls than others.
Also, their nature and seriousness vary across different industrial sectors. In this paper,

-3we are concerned with more severe types of recalls which receive significant publicity.
Such recalls are important economic events that have been shown by previous research
to result in the loss of demand for firms’ products as well as the decline in firms’ stock
prices. It has also been shown that such recalls have considerable reputational effects
which result in shareholders’ wealth losses beyond what is warranted by the direct costs
of these events.
Prior studies demonstrate that managers of the firms experiencing deteriorating
profits or share prices have relatively greater incentives to engage in earnings
management. Also, managers attempt to smooth periodic earnings by creating ‘cookiejar reserves’ in good times and drawing on these reserves in harsh times. Product recall
is one such event where managers need to level-off the downward spike in earnings and
share prices.
In order to investigate whether firms making product recall announcements are
more prone to manage earnings around the event dates, this study uses the aggregate
accruals approach for detecting earnings management. Specifically, it uses the crosssection version of the modified Jones (1991) model, as adapted by Teoh et al. (1998 a
and b), to extract the discretionary component in the reported earnings
This paper contributes to the earnings management literature by identifying an
economically important corporate event as a situation in which the managerial
incentives to distort true earnings numbers are heightened. Also, it documents the
extent of earnings management prevalent before and after the product recall
announcements. The findings have implications for firms’ shareholders, regulators and

-4other stakeholders. Should investors and others view the earnings figures announced by
the firms recalling their products with doubt? Or are these genuine profits?
Furthermore, the study contributes to product recall research by examining a dimension
of the event which has not been investigated in the research.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter II presents
the background on earnings management including a review of the previous literature in
this area. Chapter III provides the necessary background on product recalls and reviews
the empirical evidence on recalls. The research hypothesis is developed in Chapter IV.
This chapter also describes the research methodology in detail. Chapter V discusses the
sample screening procedures and the empirical results. Finally, Chapter VI summarizes
the dissertation.

CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND ON EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Earnings management research is concerned with identifying incentives for
managing earnings, investigating situations where these incentives are high, exploring
the ways in which earnings are actually managed and finally, examining the effects of
earnings management on stock prices and firms’ future financial performance. This
chapter presents an overview of the earnings management literature with added
emphasis on the issues relevant to this study. Section A in this chapter reviews some
definitions of earnings management and discusses some of its important aspects.
Section B discusses various managerial incentives for earnings management and
findings of some of the major studies. Section C describes various constraints on
earnings management as documented by prior studies. The final section of this chapter
discusses different approaches to detecting earnings management along with the merits
and shortcomings of each approach.
II. A. DEFINITION OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Below are some of the widely quoted definitions of earnings management found
in the literature:
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-6“… a purposeful intervention in the external reporting process, with
the intent of obtaining some private gain (as opposed to, say, merely
facilitating the neutral operation of the process).”… “A minor extension
of this definition would encompass “real” earnings management,
accomplished by timing investment or financing decisions to alter
reported earnings or some subset of it.”
Schipper (1989)
“Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in
financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial
reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or to influence contractual
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers.”
Healy and Whalen (1999)
Although earnings management is generally considered to occur within the
framework of financial reporting, the first definition also accommodates earnings
management through “real activities” such as timing asset sales, delaying maintenance,
altering R&D expenditure. While earnings can be managed through real activities, it is
usually relatively more costly and less convenient for managers to do that. Also, it is
methodologically difficult for the researchers to spot such manipulation. Researchers
do not have a reliable mechanism to distinguish the real decisions undertaken to modify
reported earnings from the ones undertaken solely for rational value maximization. For
instance, if a firm sells assets near the end of an accounting year, it is difficult for the

-7researcher to ascertain or demonstrate whether the primary motivation behind such a
sale is to achieve an earnings target or operational efficiency. Therefore, this research,
following the approach taken by most other in this area, focuses on earnings
management through pure accrual manipulation. In order to understand the true nature
of earnings management, one needs to first appreciate the fine line between ‘earnings
management’ and the legitimate application of accrual accounting.
II. A. 1. Earnings Management and Accrual Accounting
The primary objective of accrual accounting is to provide a better and more
meaningful measure of a firm’s current economic income and to be a better predictor of
the firm’s future performance than is available by examining cash flows. The idea is
that the earnings number should be reflective of the economic substance underlying
financial transactions rather than merely representing the cash receipts and payments for
the period. But the analysis shows that the accrual process inherently produces a
consistently smoother income number than cash flows. Expressed differently, earnings
smoothing is an inherent property of Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP) based accrual accounting. Therefore, in practice, it is quite difficult to separate
income smoothing arising from the implementation of GAAP based accrual accounting
and that resulting from management of earnings. The definitions given above rely on
managerial intent (as manifested in the words “with the intent of obtaining private
gain…” or “…mislead…or to influence contractual outcomes…”) to distinguish
earnings management from faithful implementation of accrual accounting.

-8Both the definitions quoted above correspond to the opportunistic perspective of
earnings management. The accounting literature takes two perspectives on earnings
management: (1) an information perspective and (2) an opportunistic perspective.
Under the opportunistic perspective, which has its roots in agency theory (see Jensen
and Meckling, 1976), managers are assumed to manipulate earnings to mislead
stakeholders or to maximize their (managers’) personal benefit at the cost of other
stakeholders’ interests. “Information perspective”, on the other hand, regards earnings
management as a mechanism through which managers attempt to reveal their private
information about future prospects of the company to the investors (see Holthausen and
Leftwich, 1983). Most prior research in this area is based on the opportunistic
perspective.
II. A. 2. Earnings Management versus Fraudulent Reporting
While not all attempts to manage earnings are outright fraud, many accounting
irregularities that are later classified as fraudulent reporting by the SEC emanate from
seemingly naïve efforts of the firm to smooth income by engaging in earnings
management. The National Association of Certified Fraud Examiners defines financial
fraud as: “the intentional, deliberate, misstatement or omission of material facts, or
accounting data, which is misleading and, when considered with all the information
made available, would cause the reader to change or alter his or her judgment or
decision.” Academics and regulators seem to agree on the notion that while earnings

-9management can be exercised within the limits of GAAP accounting, fraudulent
reporting necessarily entails overt violation of GAAP.3
II. B. INCENTIVES TO MANAGE EARNINGS
Prior to testing for earnings management, a researcher must identify conditions
or situations where the incentives to manage earnings exist. Prior studies identify
several such incentives, which can be broadly classified as: capital market incentives,
contracting incentives, and regulation-related incentives. This section covers a brief
explanation of the sources and nature of these incentives along with summary of related
research findings.
II. B. 1. Capital Market Incentives
Although earlier earnings management research focused heavily on contracting
and regulatory incentives ignoring the capital market motivations for managing
earnings, recent studies have found capital market incentives to be a strong driving
force behind managers’ attempts to manage earnings. Dechow and Skinner (2000)
argue that “academic research should focus more on capital market incentives for
earnings management”. The growing importance of capital market incentives in
earnings management is directly related to the increasing sensitivity of managers to
stock price movements.

3

Examples of fraudulent earnings management include recording fictitious sales, and
related receivables, deferring expenses that should be recognized in current period. A specific
example would be WorldCom’s misclassification of a staggering $3.8 billion of operating
expenses as capital expenditures.

-10Reported earnings are an important input for valuation decisions by investors,
analysts, and other market participants. The fixation of market participants on earnings
figures creates incentives for the managers to manipulate them in the direction which
best serves their own interests. Several studies investigate whether or not firms manage
earnings around various capital market transactions. These studies begin with analyzing
managerial incentives to manage earnings in the context of such transactions. The
analysis yields hypotheses about the direction of earnings management (incomeincreasing versus income-decreasing). Finally, parametric and/or non-parametric
techniques are used to test the hypothesis about the presence, direction and extent of
earnings management. The following paragraphs review selected studies falling in the
aforementioned category.
DeAngelo (1988) and Perry and Williams (1994) analyze management buyouts
and argue that in the presence of information asymmetries, managers acting in their own
interest rather than in the interest of the shareholders would attempt to get a bargain
price for the buyout. Accruals manipulation affords a convenient method for managers
to understate earnings and thus the stock price. Although DeAngelo (1988) fails to find
evidence in favor of her hypothesis, Perry and Williams (1994) document significantly
negative discretionary accruals prior to a buyout.
Likewise, Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998 a and b) make a case for incomeincreasing earnings management prior to initial public offers (IPO’s) and seasoned
equity issues (SEOs). By engaging in income-increasing earnings management prior to
these equity issues, managers can paint a favorable picture of a firm’s prospects,

-11thereby obtaining an attractive price for the newly issued stocks. They find that equity
issuing firms typically have higher earnings prior to stock issues most of which is
attributable to high discretionary current accruals. They also show that the post-issue
underperformance is strongly predicted by the extent of upward earnings management
at the time of issue. Further, the evidence indicated reversal of abnormal accruals in
years subsequent to the equity issue. Rangan (1998) and Shivakumar (2000) provide
similar evidence using quarterly data. Shivakumar (2000) uses a rational expectations
explanation to account for earnings management and subsequent investor reaction. He
contends that investors recognize and undo earnings management at the time of the
announcement.
Similar incentives exist in cases of stock-for-stock mergers. The acquiring firm
in such transactions has inducements to inflate the stock price around the agreement
date, so that the purchase can be made by issuing fewer stocks. Therefore, it is in the
interest of an acquiring firm to resort to income-increasing earnings management in
periods before the merger agreement. Erickson and Wang (1999) show that not only
are the discretionary accruals significantly positive prior to mergers, but their size has a
significant relationship with the size of the merger. Louis (2004) shows evidence of
acquiring firms using income-increasing current accruals in the quarter preceding a
stock swap announcement. He relates post-merger underperformance of acquiring
firms to the reversal of pre-merger earnings overstatement.
Beneish (1999), studying a sample of firms subject to SEC accounting
enforcement actions, documents that managers are likely to sell their shareholdings and

-12exercise stock appreciation rights when the earnings are overstated and share prices are
inflated. Park and Park (2004) find that managers engage in income-increasing
earnings management prior to the sale of shares by insiders. The degree of
discretionary accruals prior to the sale was also found to have predictive power for
stock underperformance after the insider sales.
Vafeas, Vlittis, Katranis, and Ockree (2003) find some evidence of relatively
low discretionary accruals prior to self-tender offers. However, Chou and Lin (2003)
observe that managers resort to inflating the stock price through the upward
management of discretionary accruals around the share repurchase announcements.
The authors argue that managers, through income increasing earnings management,
attempt to enhance the credibility of the undervaluation signal sent to the market by the
repurchase announcement.
Bartov and Mohanram (2004) document that managers overstate earnings before
abnormally large stock option exercises in order to increase their payout. The postexercise underperformance of the stock of such firms is reflective of the subsequent
reversal of overstated earnings. Anthony, Bettinghaus, and Farber (2004) show that
firms appear to increase discretionary current accruals around convertible debt
offerings, but fail to relate the discretionary accruals to the subsequent long-term
underperformance of such issues.
Apart from the incentives spawned by the specific capital market transactions
discussed above, strong incentives to manage earnings also arise in response to capital
market pressures for meeting simple earnings benchmarks. Burgstahler and Dichev

-13(1997) scrutinize the cross-sectional frequency distribution of earnings and changes in
earnings and notice that the probability associated with observing small losses and small
declines in earnings is lower than expected. Conversely, the incidences of small profits
and small increases in earnings from the previous year are unusually high. In the
absence of any purposeful managerial intervention in the financial reporting process,
such statistical anomalies are highly unlikely. Therefore, the authors explain these
distributional inconsistencies as arising from managerial motivation to avoid losses and
earnings declines.
Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser (1999) present a hierarchy of benchmarks for
quarterly earnings that managers attempt to achieve. Once firms have avoided losses
and earnings declines, meeting analysts’ forecasts becomes the next critical target. He
provides evidence similar to Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) regarding distributional
discontinuities around analysts’ earnings expectations. Brown (1999) finds that over
time the disruption in frequency distribution around these benchmarks has become even
more pronounced. Kasznik (1999) shows that managers use discretionary accruals to
increase income in cases where earnings are likely to fall short of management’s
forecast, and revise the forecast upward when earnings exceed their earlier forecast.
Myers and Skinner (1999), using a time-series approach, provide evidence that
the firms manage earnings to show consistent earnings growth. In their sample, the
number of firms reporting a continuous increase in earnings is unusually high. Further,
they show that firms use special items and income tax provision for income smoothing.

-14II. B. 2. Contracting Incentives
Early research in earnings management focused on managerial motivations to
manage earnings arising from firms’ contracts with other stakeholders. Typically, terms
of such contracts incorporated earnings figures as a key to certain payoffs to the parties
involved (e.g., management bonuses) or as a mechanism for monitoring the compliance
with contract terms (e.g., lending contracts). Managers enjoy a unique position in these
contracts as they are, on one hand, a party to the contract (being affected by the
outcome of earnings), and, on the other hand, perched at a vantage point to influence
contractual outcomes by managing reported earnings. Under agency theory arguments,
managers are expected to influence the earnings in a manner that would best serve their
self-interest. Watts and Zimmerman (1978) identified managerial incentives to affect
accounting choices in the context of bonus schemes, lending agreements, and taxes, as
well as political costs. Below, we discuss major research works on earnings
management related to two important contracts: earnings-based management
compensation contracts and lending contracts.
II. B. 2. a. Compensation Contracts:
Most companies tie managerial bonus awards to the reported earnings. Watts
and Zimmerman (1983), using agency theory arguments, postulate that managers,
acting to maximize the present value of their wealth, would attempt to choose those
accounting procedures that would shift the reported earnings to the present period.
Zmijewski and Hagerman (1981), in one of the earliest papers in this area, reported a
significant association between management incentive contracts and income strategy

-15(firm’s accounting choices to arrive at income). Healy (1985), in a seminal work in
‘bonus plan’ research, documented a strong association between accruals and earningsrelated incentives under bonus plans.4 Specifically, the study found that managers tend
to manage accruals downward when upper or lower bounds of their bonus plans are
binding and upward when these limits are not binding. They also found evidence that
adjustments in accounting methods are associated with modifications in the bonus
schemes.
Gaver, Gaver and Austin (1995) extended Healy’s work by using the Jones
(1991) model and detailed proprietary dataset to gauge the behavior of discretionary
accruals with respect to bonus schemes. Unlike Healy, they found that firms engage in
income-increasing earnings manipulation when un-managed earnings fall short of the
lower bound. Likewise, Holthausen, Larcker and Sloan (1995) confirmed Healy’s
findings of downward earnings management when the executive bonuses peak, but
failed to find evidence for downward earnings management when earnings are below
the lower bound. Guidry, Leone and Rock (1999) improved the methodology in this
line of research by using business unit data rather than corporate level data. Consistent
with Healy (1985), they find that business unit level managers for large conglomerate
multinational firms are likely to resort to income decreasing accruals when the earnings
target in their bonus plans will not be met and when they are entitled to the maximum
bonuses allowed under the plans. Richardson and Waegelein (2002) showed that the

4

Healy (1985) treated the mean total accruals in the estimation period as a measure of
non-discretionary accruals. Thus, discretionary accruals were defined as deviation from this
mean.

-16firms having long-term performance plans engage in earnings management to a lesser
extent than firms that have only short-term bonus plans.
Aside from bonus schemes, earnings management has also been linked to top
executives’ job security and other implicit incentives. DeAngelo (1988) shows
evidence of income-increasing earnings management during proxy fights (a potential
threat to managers’ job security). Dempsey (1993) documents an inverse relationship
between earnings management and managerial ownership. He attributed non-owner
managers’ job insecurity as a possible reason for this result. Gao and Shrieves (2002)
relate the degree of earnings management to the design of compensation contracts.
They show that earnings management is likely to be relatively more intense for firms
having higher degrees of stock options or bonuses and lower proportions of salaries in
the pay structure. Some evidence related to stock options is covered in the section on
capital market incentives.
II. B. 2. b. Lending Contracts
Debt contracts generally include accounting-based covenants for the protection
of the lenders. Typically, these covenants require firms to maintain certain financial
ratios (like leverage, working capital, fixed charge coverage, and related ratios), and
impose restrictions on dividends as well as on borrowings. For those firms that are
approaching the violation of accounting-based covenants, a tempting alternative to
contravening the contract terms is to engage in income-increasing earnings
management. Arguing along these lines, several accounting researchers investigated the
earnings management behavior of firms facing covenant violation. For example, Press

-17and Weintrop (1990) investigated the effects of accounting constraints of debt
agreements on a firm’s accounting choices. They show that accounting choices are
significantly affected by both leverage and a leverage constraint indicator (a measure of
the closeness to violating a leverage ratio covenant). More specifically, they find that
firms resort to income increasing strategies in the presence of leverage constraints.
Bartov (1993) documents a significantly positive relationship between the gains from
asset sales and a firm’s debt-to-equity ratio (which is a researcher’s proxy for closeness
to a covenant violation). DeFond and Jiambalvo (1994) provided evidence that the
firms that eventually end-up violating covenants resort to income-increasing earnings
management in the year preceding the violation. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner
(1994) scrutinized the accounting choices of troubled firms (i.e., those firms with
persistent losses and dividend reductions). They reported that such firms had
significant income-decreasing accruals in the dividend-reduction-year and in the
following three years, a time period during which these firms engaged in contract
renegotiations with lenders, unions, and the government. Similarly, Sweeney (1994)
finds evidence for income increasing accounting changes for firms approaching default.
Furthermore, the covenant violators also managed earnings after the technical default,
possibly to avoid future violations.
Thus the overall evidence on earnings management in the context of
‘compensation’ and ‘lending contracts’ suggests that these contracts induce managers to
manipulate earnings to increase bonus remuneration and job-security and decrease the
likelihood of technical default.

-18II. B. 3. Regulatory Motivations
Another potential source of earnings management incentives arises from
government regulations. These incentives are more pronounced in cases where
industries face heavier regulatory burden. Typically, regulators monitor certain
accounting figures to ensure firms’ compliance with industry-specific and anti-trust
regulations, which in turn, motivates managers to manipulate accruals in the desired
direction. These incentives are strong, especially when the firms are on the verge of
violating the regulation. For instance, banks must comply with capital adequacy
requirements. If they fail to do so, they risk regulatory intervention in the form of
restrictions on dividends, mandatory asset reduction, and ultimately, management
dismissal. Therefore, banks that are near the minimum required capital are found to
manage earnings upward to ward-off regulatory crackdown. Scholes, Wilson and
Wolfson (1990) find evidence of earnings management from income from investment
security transactions. Moyer (1990) shows that banks manage loan loss reserves and
securities gains to manipulate earnings. Clinch and Magliolo (1993) show that bank
managers use income from discretionary transactions (like miscellaneous gains and
losses) to manage earnings. Collins, Shackelford and Wahlen (1995) find that loan
write-offs, security issuances, and dividend payments are used to manage capital and
loan loss reserves to manage earnings. Beatty, Chamberlain and Magliolo (1995) find
that loan loss reserves, loan-write offs, and security issue decisions are jointly
determined to manage primary capital ratios.

-19Apart from industry-specific regulations, incentives to manage earnings also
stem from a host of other regulations. Specifically, firms facing adverse political
consequences like anti-trust or anti-dumping investigations, have incentives to appear
less profitable (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Similarly, firms seeking government
subsidies or protection from foreign competition may attempt to win government
sympathy by appearing to be financially weak. Jones (1991) documents that the firms
undergoing import relief investigation by the U.S. International Trade Commission
engage in income-decreasing earnings management so that they can obtain a favorable
verdicts. Likewise, Cahan (1992) documents that firms that are under investigation for
antitrust violations by the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
manage earnings downward during the investigation period. Cahan, Chavis, and
Elemendorf (1997) show that at the time when Congress was debating a proposal to
impose environmental clean-up costs on the chemical industry, the firms in that industry
exhibited income decreasing accruals. Key (1997) shows similar behavior on the part
of cable television companies during Congressional investigations regarding industry
deregulation. Han and Wang (1998) show that petroleum refining firms managed
earnings downward around Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait to hide excessive profits resulting
from a steep surge in oil prices in order to avoid possible regulatory actions against
them.
II. C. BIG BATH ACCOUNTING
One earnings management approach that deserves special mention when
investigating firms’ reporting behavior around adverse announcements (like product
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‘bad’ year or quarter overstate their losses in an attempt to clean up their balance sheets
and create a buffer which can be used to artificially inflate the earnings in future
periods. Big bath accounting is manifested in sizeable asset write-offs as well as in
income decreasing discretionary accruals.
Big bath behavior is encouraged by Wall Street’s tendency to overlook large
write-offs as one-time events and focus on future earnings. Firms can afford to
overstate their losses (i.e., take a big bath) because of the fact that investor reaction to
adverse earnings news does not exacerbate proportionally to its intensity. Stated
differently, the market reaction to an earnings announcement for a 15% shortfall in
earnings may be only slightly more negative than the reaction to a 10% shortfall.
Therefore, when the firms find that their earnings are far too short of market
expectations so that even the plausible manipulation of discretionary items would not
help them achieve the target, they might resort to taking a big bath instead. Remaining
paragraphs in this section present a brief summary of prior findings on big bath
accounting.
A typical context in which the big bath hypothesis has been most frequently
explored is management changes. Moore (1973) investigated the prevalence of
discretionary accounting decisions subsequent to management changes. He found the
incidences of income decreasing accounting choices to be significantly higher in firms
with management changes relative to firms with no management change. In a similar
vein, Pourciau (1993) investigated firms’ earnings management practices around non-
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downward and take large write-offs in the year of change and manage earnings upward
in the subsequent year. Collins and DeAngelo (1990) provide similar evidence of
income decreasing earnings management subsequent to management changes as a result
of proxy contests.
Healy’s (1985) work regarding bonus payments mentioned in section II. B. 2.
also lends support to the big bath hypothesis. Langer and Lev (1993) found that firms
are likely to take large asset write-offs when earnings fall below the lower bound for
bonus calculations. Abarbanell and Lehavy (2002) demonstrate that firms that receive
unfavorable ratings (i.e., “Sell” recommendations) from analysts have weak incentives
to meet earnings expectations. Consequently, these firms resort to taking a ‘big bath’
during such periods and they create hidden reserves that enable them to manage
earnings upward in the future. This is evidenced by the presence of frequent and
extreme negative discretionary accruals for such firms in those periods. On the other
hand, firms that receive favorable analyst ratings (i.e., “Buy” recommendations), tend to
engage in income-increasing earnings management to meet the analysts’ expectations
on a more frequent basis. Elliot and Shaw (1988) and Strong and Meyer (1987) provide
evidence for association between large write-offs and firms’ underperformance.
Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical framework
developed by Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) where they show that both
smoothing and big bath can coexist. They show that “for sufficiently “bad” news, the
manager under-reports earnings by the maximum, preferring to take a “big bath” in the
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manager smoothes earnings, with the amount of smoothing depending on the level of
cash flows observed. He either over-reports or partially under-reports for slightly good
news, and gradually increases his under-reporting as the news gets better, until he is
under-reporting the maximum amount for sufficiently good news. This result holds both
when investors are “naïve” and ignore management’s ability to manipulate earnings,
and when they are “sophisticated” and correctly infer management's disclosure
strategy”.
Preceding sections focused on the motivations and incentives for earnings
management. The next section presents various factors that act as constraints on
managers’ ability to maneuver earnings to suit their interests.
II. D. CONSTRAINTS ON MANAGING EARNINGS
As mentioned earlier, the prevalent GAAP allows managers to exercise
considerable discretion in estimating earnings. On one hand, this flexibility gives
managers an opportunity to communicate an earnings figure that incorporates their
unbiased future expectations. On the other hand, the same flexibility can be exploited
to manipulate earnings opportunistically. However, managers do not have complete
liberty to manage earnings at will. They face several constraints or limitations. Prior
research identifies several limiting factors on the ability or incentives of managers to
manipulate earnings. Jiambalvo (1996), for instance, lists several factors that may
inhibit managers’ ability to manipulate earnings: auditing, internal controls, governance
structures, the probability that earnings management would be detected, the cost
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earnings management decisions.
One of the factors identified by prior research that restrains earnings
management is an audit - especially by a reputable audit firm. Perhaps, auditors’
concerns about reputational damage and litigation risk induces them to question dubious
accounting estimates more frequently and rigorously.
Becker, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998) document the negative
relationship between auditors’ quality and the level of discretionary accruals.
Specifically, they found that the mean and the median absolute abnormal accruals are
higher for non-big-six accounting firms. Francis and Krishnan (1999) show that
auditors’ reporting conservatism is high for firms having higher accruals, that is,
auditors (specifically the big six firms) are more likely to issue modified reports for
firms having high components of (especially income-increasing) accruals in their
reported figures. Francis, Maydew and Sparks (1999) provide similar evidence on the
relationship between earnings management and audit quality. They show that although
the total accruals are higher for companies audited by the big six audit firms, the
amounts of discretionary accruals are significantly lower. Basu et al. (2000) find the
reported earnings to be more conservative in the audited (fourth) quarter than those in
interim ones. Mendenhall and Nichols (1988) provide empirical evidence for the
hypothesis that managers have more discretion in the interim quarters (which are
usually unaudited) relative to the audited fourth quarter. DeFond and Subramanyam
(1998) found that in cases where companies switched auditors, discretionary accruals
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predecessor auditor, and were insignificant in the first year of a newly appointed
auditor. Krishnan (1994) shows that auditor conservatism might induce a firm to
change its auditors. However, according to evidence shown by Krishnan and Stephens
(1995), switchers are treated relatively conservatively by both predecessor and
successor auditors. Krishnan (2003) shows that specialist auditors (those having
industry expertise) do a better job in controlling earnings management than nonspecialist ones. Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the notion that the
audits, especially those by reputable firms, act as a deterrent to manage earnings.
Another constraint on earnings management is the ownership of firms by
managers. Dempsey, Hunt III, and Schroeder (1993) examined the relationship
between corporate ownership structures and earnings management through
extraordinary items. They observed that non-owner managers engaged in incomeincreasing earnings management more frequently as compared to owner managers.
They offered the explanation that non-owner managers have relatively less job security,
and they have to work harder to keep shareholders satisfied with the performance of the
firm.
Warfield, Wild, and Wild (1995) hypothesize and find that firms having
relatively higher levels of managerial ownership have lower discretionary accruals. In
cases where managers have higher ownership stakes in the firm, their incentives to
manage earnings opportunistically may be limited.
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earnings is curtailed by a higher degree of institutional ownership. They argue that
higher informativeness of institutional investors may lower “perceived benefits of
managing accruals”. Bushee (1998) shows evidence of better monitoring by
institutional investors as compared to individual ones. Specifically, the study shows
that firms with a high proportion of institutional ownership are less prone to use R&D
for earnings management purposes.
Dechow et al. (1996) demonstrate that stronger corporate governance structures
also discourage earnings management. They study the profile of firms singled out by
the SEC for enforcement actions against them. Typically, these are firms that have
overtly and opportunistically manipulated earnings. They found that such firms are
more likely to have (1) boards dominated by managers, (2) CEOs serving as board
chairmen, (3) CEOs who are also the founders of the firms, and (4) no audit
committees. Pope, Peasnell and Young (1998) hypothesize that the presence of outside
directors on companies’ boards serves to curb earnings management. Consistent with
their hypothesis, they document a statistically significant negative association between
income-increasing accruals and the proportion of outside board directors. Beasley
(1996) documents that the higher the proportion of outside directors on the board, the
lower the probability of financial statements fraud, implying that outside directors serve
as a constraint on financial statement manipulation. Klein (2002) shows that lower
levels of discretionary accruals are associated with relatively more independent audit
committees and boards of directors. Chtourou, Bédard, and Courteau (2001) relate the
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committees comprised of a larger proportion of outside members not serving as
managers in other firms, (2) audit committees vested with “clear mandate for
overseeing both financial statements and external audit”, (3) audit committees having at
least one member with financial expertise and the necessary authority for monitoring
financial statements and external audits, and (4) boards of directors having experienced
outside members. Xie, Davidson and DaDalt (2003) found relatively low levels of
discretionary current accruals for firms with (1) more frequent board and audit
committee meetings and (2) more financially sophisticated board and committee
members.
Finally, Barton and Simko (2002) hypothesize that a balance sheet acts as a
constraint on earnings management. Since previous (income-increasing) earnings
management is reflected in the overstated values of net assets on the balance sheet, they
act as constraints on managers’ ability to opportunistically overstate reported earnings.
The authors provide empirical evidence that “the likelihood of meeting or beating
analysts’ earnings forecasts by optimistically biasing earnings decreases with the extent
to which net assets are already overstated on the balance sheet.”
II. E. APPROACHES TO DETECTING EARNINGS MANAGEMENT
Methodologies used by earnings management studies can be broadly classified
into three broad approaches:
1. the aggregate or total accruals approach,
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3. the earnings distribution approach.
The methodologies based on ‘aggregate accruals’ attempt to model expectations
of normal or non-discretionary accruals based on explanatory factors relating to firms’
economic environment. The portion of accruals unexplained by these factors is called
abnormal or discretionary accruals and is regarded as a proxy of earnings management.
The pioneers of this approach were Healy (1985) who considered total accruals as a
measure of earnings management and DeAngelo (1986) who took change in total
accruals as a measure thereof. Jones (1991) enhanced the sophistication of these
techniques by suggesting a regression based model to isolate discretionary accruals.
Models later developed in this area were extensions or modifications of the Jones
(1991) model.
Unlike the ‘aggregate accruals’ approach, the ‘specific accrual’ approach
focuses on modeling the behavior of a particular accrual in order to sort out the
discretionary and non-discretionary components. Rather than suspecting entire accruals
as the source of earnings management, this approach identifies a single source where
managers are most likely to exercise their discretion. Ideal candidates for such a source
are those accrual accounts which, on one hand, are large enough to be an effective
source of earnings management and, on the other hand, require managerial judgment in
their estimation. Naturally, researchers’ prior expectations about such accounts would
vary from one industry setting to another. Below are some major contributions (along
with the accrual types examined by them in parenthesis): McNichols and Wilson, 1988
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and Beaver and Engel 1996 (loan loss reserves in banking firms). An advantage of this
approach over the aggregate accruals approach is that it enables the researcher to focus
on one major account. Using the knowledge of GAAP and fundamentals affecting the
specific account, researchers can better model its behavior. However, according to
McNichols (2000), the specific accruals approach has several problems. First, it
requires greater industry knowledge and a richer dataset. Second, there is a potential
risk that while focusing on specific accounts, researchers might fail to detect earnings
management taking place in other accounts. Lastly, the results may not be
generalizable to other firms and industries.
The third approach to detecting earnings management examines the distribution
of reported earnings to spot any statistical inconsistencies from the expected distribution
of earnings. Specifically, these studies search for discontinuities in the frequency
distribution of earnings around some threshold or benchmark earnings figure. These
benchmarks include last year’s earnings, zero earnings, and earnings expected by
analysts. The pioneers of this approach, Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and Degeorge
et al. (1999), hypothesize and find evidence of earnings management around these
thresholds. The distributions based approach avoids some of the critical objections
raised against alternative approaches. For instance, under this approach, errors related
to the measurement of discretionary accruals are avoided. This is because the focus of
the distribution approach is on the comparison between the earnings distribution in the
absence of any manipulation and earnings distribution observed in reality rather than on
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addition to capturing earnings management through accruals, this approach also detects
earnings management through real activities. However, a limitation of the distribution
approach is that it fails to identify the magnitude of earnings management and the
manner in which it is practiced.
In short, each of the three approaches to detect earnings management has its
benefits and shortcomings. A researcher’s job is to choose the most appropriate
approach given the research objectives, data availability, and the nature of the research
problem. To the best of our knowledge, almost all earnings management studies that
attempt to detect the degree of earnings management around a certain corporate event
employ the aggregate accruals approach. Accordingly, this study also relies on
aggregate or total accrual models to examine firms’ earnings management practices
around product recalls.
This chapter provided a brief overview of the empirical research on earnings
management, an area which is growing at a very rapid pace. The next chapter presents
the necessary background on product recalls along with a review of prior research on
this topic. Taken together both chapters provide the necessary theoretical framework on
which we will build our research hypothesis.

CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND ON PRODUCT RECALLS
This chapter presents the essential background on product recalls. First, a brief
introduction and general background is provided on product recalls as an important
firm-specific event including some basic information on the nature and process of
recalls. Second, direct and indirect costs associated with recalls are analyzed in order to
better understand the economic impact of product recalls. Lastly, an overview of prior
studies on product recall is presented.
III. A. NATURE AND TYPES OF PRODUCT RECALLS
Hundreds of products are recalled each year. An overwhelming majority of
these products is recalled because of safety concerns.5 The recall itself consists of
corrective actions by a firm needed to protect consumers from harmful effects of a
potentially hazardous product.
The corrective actions may involve anything from minor repairs to completely
replacing the product or disbursing full refunds to the customers. Nearly all recalls are

5

According to the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, there are 300 recalls
each year and it costs the nation more than $700 billion in deaths, injuries and property damage
from consumer products. Source: “How Do You Know if You Have a Recalled Product?”
Wyoming Tribune-Eagle, December 6, 2004.
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-31voluntarily undertaken by the manufacturer or distributor of the product. However, if
the firm involved fails to cooperate, the regulatory authority has the legal right to
enforce the recall.
Recalls vary widely in terms of the gravity of the product defect that triggers the
recall. The product defects prompting recalls can range from being life threatening
defects to minor mislabeling problems. The number of units involved in a recall can
vary widely too. It can range from a few units to several million items.6 Recalls also
differ vastly in the scope of efforts and resources required to implement them. Certain
recall efforts simply require sending some additional instructions regarding product
safety and handling.7 Other recall campaigns can be very extensive requiring complete
destruction and permanent removal of all units of the product involved.
This study focuses on newsworthy recalls that have significant economic
consequences. The trade press typically covers recalls by large reputed firms involving
products with safety related defects.
III. B. THE PROCESS OF PRODUCT RECALLS
A recall may be initiated by the manufacturer or the federal agencies monitoring
compliance with national safety standards. Consumer safety legislations (like the
6

In order to appreciate the massive scale of some recalls, consider theses examples: In
2002, Wampler Foods (a subsidiary of Pilgrim’s Pride Corporation) recalled 27.4 million
pounds of cooked deli products. Similarly, in 1996 Ford Motor Co. recalled 8.7 million
vehicles in the largest auto recall ever. Recently, the recall of Merck’s arthritis drug Vioxx with
annual sales of 2.5 billion dollars became all-time largest prescription drug withdrawal.
7

Such recalls are referred to as placards recalls because they merely involve mailing
instructions on placards to investors apprising them of the possible safety hazard and
precautions to be taken in product usage.
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channels to report any safety related defects to federal agencies as soon as they surface.
Federal regulatory agencies (like the FDA, CPSC, EPA, NHTSA) also gather
information about safety related defects from their inspectors, news stories, emergencyroom records, and death certificates. However, most of the initial reports come from
consumers themselves. As soon as the agency learns of a potentially unsafe product, it
opens up a preliminary investigation to determine if the product violates mandatory
safety standards. Once it is ascertained that the product is in fact hazardous or of
significantly substandard quality, the authority requests the firm to recall the product.
Subsequently, the firm and agency make a joint announcement regarding the recall. A
number of channels (including first-class mail, press releases, websites, and distribution
networks) may be used to communicate the announcement to the consumers.
III. C. THE COST OF PRODUCT RECALLS
This section analyzes the components and nature of costs associated with a
typical recall. Evidently, most recalls involve considerable costs. Even though the
direct costs of recalls are substantial in their own right, the indirect costs related to
recalls can exceed direct costs by several times. Costs that are directly attributable to
product recalls may include, among others, the following 8:

8

Based on “AIG offers coverage for product recalls” Anonymous. Rough Notes.
Indianapolis: Jul 1999. Vol. 142, Issue. 7; p. 42 and “Company's insurance may ease the blow”.
By: Higgins, Greg; Landa, Shellie. Business Journal (Central New York), 04/16/99, Vol. 13
Issue 15, p. 18.

-33•

Investigation costs paid by the firm to test the product defects as well as fees
paid to outside consultants for analysis. It includes costs of employee
interviews, engineering and equipment tests.

•

Communication costs incurred in the process of contacting customers like
letters to consumers, announcements on TV, newspapers, magazines or
websites.

•

Transportation costs to bring the product to the centers where they would be
repaired, restored, modified or disposed.

•

Warehousing costs for holding the products during the recall process.

•

Overtime and other employee-related expenses.

•

Product disposal costs including the costs of destroying or disposing faulty
parts

•

Inventory Losses including any unsold inventory that has to be destroyed, in
addition to any products removed from market circulation.

•

Fines paid to government agencies.

•

Restoration costs to replace or restore the recalled product.

•

Redistribution costs incurred to deliver the restored products back to
customers.

•

Costs to replace a recalled product that has been destroyed or is unfit for its
original use.

•

Capital expenditure to renovate or replace the equipment responsible for
faulty products.
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response rate to recall announcements9, the indirect costs associated with a recall
remain formidable in most circumstances. Also, indirect costs persist for longer periods
of time. These costs are reflected in losses in the equity value of the firm above and
beyond the associated direct costs. Various expressions have been used in the literature
to represent these indirect costs. Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) refer to these costs as
“goodwill losses”; Dranove and Olsen (1994) call them “a general loss of faith”; Alessi
and Staaf (1994) term them as “loss of trade mark capital”. Indirect costs include, but
are not limited to, the following:


Reduction in Future Sales: Recalls convey negative information about the
quality and reliability of recalling firms’ products resulting in loss of consumer
confidence. Several studies show that the demand for these firms’ products is
adversely affected after recall announcements.10



Cost of Litigation: Recalls immediately expose the announcing firm to
product-liability litigation.11 Defense against lawsuits filed by customers,
consumer groups, or government agencies entails substantial outlays.

9

According to a Consumer Reports (August 2004) article, almost one-third of all
vehicles subject to recall; more than half of toys, clothes, appliances, tools, and electronics gear;
and three-fourths of child car seats remain on the road or in the home. Source: Consumer
Reports, August, 2004, Vol. 69, No. 8; Pg. 12, CR Investigates. The Trouble With Recalls.
2004.
10
11

The next section gives a detailed account of these studies.

Within the first 15 days after announcing Vioxx’s recall, Merck & Company was
named in 300 lawsuits on behalf of 900 plaintiff groups. Estimates of Vioxx's legal costs have
ranged between $4 billion and $18 billion.
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Public Relations Costs: Soon after announcing a product recall, firms have no
choice but to come out and actively defend themselves against mounting public
criticism. Firms attempt to convince the public that all efforts were done to
prevent the hazard and the product was recalled immediately upon learning
about the defects. Again, significant outlays are associated with the efforts to
rehabilitate the image of the company or its product following the recall.12
III. D. PRIOR STUDIES ON PRODUCT RECALLS

III. D. 1. The Effects of Product Recall Announcements on Demand and Sales
Wynne and Hoffer (1976) published one of the first papers in the series of
empirical studies examining the economic consequences of a product recall. The paper,
like most others in the area of product recall research, focused on the auto industry
(specifically, it studied the ‘subcompact’ market segment to hold the effects of style
constant). The authors tested the hypothesis that safety-related auto recalls, which
generally entail negative publicity to the manufacturer, adversely affect the market
share of the same make of automobile. Covering recalls from the beginning of 1971 to
first quarter 1973, they found only limited evidence of a significant decline in market
share of the recalled products. They also found that for those recall campaigns that are
concentrated in time, there is a significant drop in the market share of the announcing
firm.

12

After the recall of Explorer/Firestone Tires (one of the most notorious recalls in
corporate history), Ford Motor Co. spent at least $5 million on series of TV ads which featured
the CEO Jacques Nasser trying to reassure the public. This was just a part of a far more
extensive public relations effort.
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Crafton, Hoffer and Reilly (1981). They used a randomized block design or paired
difference tests to examine the relationship between recalls and future automobile
demand. At first, the recall events in the sample period (1970-1978) were classified
according to their severity, with Type III recalls being the most severe category. Severe
(or Type III) recalls included, for example, problems resulting in loss of brakes or
steering control, problems that could cause vehicle fires or acute and recurring engine
stalling. Type I and Type II recalls covered problems of minor and intermediate
severity, respectively.13 The authors did not find any evidence of a significant effect of
recalled models on sales as a result of the Type I recalls, Type II recalls, or all three
types of recalls taken together. However, they found that the severe, or Type III, recalls
significantly decreased the unit sales of recalled model. Not only that, the adverse
impact of Type III recalls of a particular model was also reflected in the sales of similar
models produced by competitors. The results of this study corroborated the contention
that severe recalls convey negative information about the product quality to consumers
who, in turn, curtail their future purchases of the recalled model.
Reilly and Hoffer (1983) conducted a similar analysis over the 1978-1981
period. They argued that because of the unavailability of other objective measures of
quality, government-mandated auto recalls serve as a proxy of the vehicles’ quality.
Accordingly, they studied whether recalls affect subsequent consumer purchases of the

13

Minor (Type I) recalls included tire, carjack and seatbelt related problems, as well as
placard recalls. Intermediate (Type II) recalls included missing bolts or other key parts,
emission control problems and wind-shield wiper problems.
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car line would be negatively associated with both the recall frequency and the extent of
negative publicity each recall event receives in the media. Naturally, a single recall
event which draws considerable media attention and spawns sizeable adverse publicity
is likely to have a greater impact on sales than multiple recall announcements which go
relatively unnoticed in the media. However, due to the unavailability of other
acceptable and objective measures of the degree of publicity, the authors used the
severity ranking and the number of vehicles involved in the recall campaign as proxies
for media coverage and negative publicity. Consequently, the recalls were ranked as
severe, intermediate, or minor depending on the scale of potential safety hazard
associated with it. The study found evidence of a significant negative effect on sales
immediately after the announcement for the recalls classified severe. For minor or
intermediate recalls, however, there was no significant dent in sales. Although, on the
whole, this study confirmed the results of Crafton, Hoffer and Reilly (1981), it found
conflicting evidence on the sales behavior of competitive models. The evidence
showed that the recall announcement had a salutary effect on the sales of similar models
offered by competitors. The authors inferred that this effect could be explained by the
increasing consumer loyalty to the segment of their choice. Rather than switching to a
different model, consumers tend to switch to other manufacturers. Overall, the
evidence indicated that auto recalls have significant economic consequences for both
the firms making the announcement and their competitors.
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products on consumer demand. In line with Crafton et al. (1981), they treated recalls as
indicators of low product quality and attempted to gauge the consumer reactions to
recall announcements. They tested whether recall indices or media coverage of the
recall event affected demand. Recall indices were obtained by linearly aggregating the
number of Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) reported recall events for beef, pork,
and poultry each quarter during the 1982 to 1998 period. To measure media coverage,
the authors used the number of articles that appeared in the top fifty English language
newspapers reporting the recall event. They found significantly negative
contemporaneous and lagged effects of recalls on the demand for beef and pork. The
lagged effect lasted for three quarters. For poultry however, the negative and
significant effect was found only in the period of announcement. There was a
significant and negative relationship between the incidence of recall (as measured by
FSIS recall indices) and the demand for meat. However, the association between media
indices and demand was found to be statistically insignificant. The study also
documented that recall of one type of meat negatively affects the demand for other meat
categories, suggesting that consumers substitute other consumer goods in place of meat.
Based on the evidence, the authors concluded that the meat recalls lower the perceived
quality of meat, resulting in a reduced demand for it.
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Another set of articles within the product recall research focuses on the effect of
recall announcements on shareholders’ wealth. Pioneering work in this area was done
by Jarrell and Peltzman (1985).
The authors approached the issue of recalls as one of capital market efficiency.
They argued that efficient capital markets should internalize the cost of recalls so that
the size of the penalty to shareholders should be sufficient to deter production of
defective products in the future. This argument implied that the losses to shareholders
as a result of product recalls should be significantly higher than the direct cost of
recalls. In order to test for the size and significance of share price reaction to recall
announcement, they focused on drug and automotive recalls. They estimated the direct
costs and shareholder wealth losses related to 116 automobile recalls overseen by the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration and with 26 drug recalls overseen by
the Federal Drug Administration over the period from 1974 to 1982. Results of their
study support the hypothesis that losses in the capital market do, in fact, provide
considerable deterrence to selling defective products which have a potential to be
recalled. Specifically, they found that the shareholder losses as a consequence of
product recalls far exceeded the direct costs of recalls. In fact, these losses were several
times larger than direct costs which were quite generously estimated. The authors also
found that recalls involving complete product withdrawals as well as the ones receiving
greater publicity proved to be more costly for the shareholders. Furthermore, weak
evidence of intra-industry contagion effects was also documented by this study.
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after revising their methodology and amending their dataset for the automobile recall
sample. They found that the significance of Jarrell and Peltzman’s findings are lost, at
least for the automobile recalls. However, a number of subsequent studies reconfirmed
significant and negative stock price reactions to product recalls in a variety of industry
settings. Barber and Darrough (1996) studied an expanded sample of automobile
recalls covering a longer period of time (from 1973 to 1992) and a broader classification
of auto manufacturers (including the recalls by three Japanese automakers in addition to
the three domestic ones). They confirmed the results of Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) by
documenting significant and negative stock market reactions to recalls. However, in
contrast to Jarrell and Peltzman (1985), they failed to find any spillover effects for
competitors.
Pruitt and Peterson (1986) investigated the information content of 156 nonautomotive recalls reported by the Wall Street Journal from 1968 to 1983. The
automotive sector was excluded because of the exceptionally high frequency of auto
recalls over the sample period, possibly resulting in sample bias. In addition to
measuring the market reaction to recall announcements, the study also attempted to
ascertain the length of time for which the stock prices keep on adjusting after the initial
release of the information. They found a statistically significant negative price reaction
in the 2-day window around the announcement date. Furthermore, the product recall
announcement in the Wall Street Journal was unanticipated by the market as none of
the 20 day returns leading to the announcement date turned out to be statistically
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adjustments in the stock price that went on for almost two months after the
announcement. Rubin, Murphy and Jarrell (1988) examined a sample of CPSC recalls
during the period 1977 to 1981 and confirmed the results of previous studies showing
significant negative equity responses to the event.
Pruitt, Reilly and Hoffer (1986) studied the intra-industry effects of recall
announcements. In addition to confirming significantly negative own-share price
reactions to Type III automobile recalls, the study documented intra-industry
competitive effects. In other words, the equity of the recalling firm’s competitors
exhibited significantly positive reactions at the time of the recall. This finding
substantiates the results of Reilly and Hoffer (1983), but it conflicts with the intraindustry contagion effects documented by Jarrell and Peltzman (1985) and Crafton,
Hoffer and Reilly (1981).
In sum, product recalls have significant economic repercussions for the
announcing firms. The direct and indirect costs associated with the recalls are
substantial. Recalls adversely affect firms’ revenues, profitability and, consequently,
stock prices. Under such circumstances, the management of firms with recalls is under
considerable pressure to mitigate the damage caused by the recall and to deal with the
grim prospects faced by the firm. The following chapter discusses the a priori
expectations regarding the earnings management practices of the firm in the context of
product recalls

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
This chapter develops the main hypotheses and lays out the research design of
the study. Section A in this chapter develops the hypotheses regarding the earnings
management practices of firms around recalls in the light of the findings of previous
earnings management and product recall studies. Section B describes and justifies the
measure of discretionary accruals (or earnings management) employed in this study
along with the tests to gauge the statistical significance thereof.
IV. A. RESEARCH HYPOTHESES
After an extensive review of the background on earnings management and
product recalls, we turn our attention to the development of hypotheses for this
research. Our central task in this section is to develop the hypotheses that would
capture the reporting behavior of managers when their firms face a product recall.
While reviewing the prior literature, we found support for two alternate scenarios of
reporting behavior for an adverse economic event like product recalls. This section
presents our a priori expectations of firms’ reporting behaviors in the form of two
hypotheses, both of which are well documented in previous studies. The first one is
known as the ‘smoothing’ hypothesis and the second is called the ‘big bath’ hypothesis.
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in support of our hypotheses.
IV. A. 1. Smoothing Hypothesis
As discussed earlier, the reported earnings per share figure is a crucial input for
valuation decisions by investors, analysts, and other market participants. Consequently,
earnings announcements not only attract a lot of attention from market participants, but
they also affect stock prices significantly. Share prices have been found to soar on
positive earnings surprises and plunge on negative ones.
A number of news articles and empirical studies shows that investors and other
market participants have a strong aversion for negative earnings surprises. Early in the
first quarter of 2000, Lucent Technologies, Inc., lost $ 64 billion (or 30% of its market
value) as a result of disclosing that it would miss analysts’ expectations. Likewise, SEC
chairman Arthur Levitt mentioned “I recently read of one major U.S. company that
failed to meet its so-called "numbers" by one penny, and lost more than six percent of
its stock value in one day.” There are numerous examples of firms suffering from
substantial losses in stock value as a result of failing to meet the expectations.
The significance of the impact of earnings surprises on stock prices is also
documented in a number of empirical studies. Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver
(1968) published one of the earliest studies that documented the direct relationship
between earnings surprises and the consequent stock price reactions. Brown,
Hagerman, and Zmijewski (1987) also report negative stock price revisions as a result
of a negative earnings surprise. Skinner and Sloan (2001) document evidence that a
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reactions, especially for growth firms. Myers and Skinner (1999) show that firms that
exhibit steady growth with few surprises often get rewarded with premiums from
investors in the form of higher stock prices.
Since managers’ job security, bonus pay and stock option values are all tied to
stock price movements, they are under enormous pressure to show steadily growing
earning numbers with little or no negative surprises. Bergstresser and Philippon (2004)
document a positive association between the degree of earnings management and the
extent to which managers’ financial benefits are directly tied to share prices. Lambert
(1984) and Dye (1988) suggest a similar relationship between managers’ income
smoothing tendency and stock prices based compensation contracts. Moses (1987) also
found that income smoothing behavior is associated with the existence of bonus plans.
Recent studies confirm a managerial tendency to avoid negative earnings
surprises. Managers attempt to avoid losses and declines in earnings (Burgstahler and
Dichev, 1997). Further, once the benchmark of positive earnings and increase in
earnings are met, the managers then attempt to meet analysts’ expectations (Degeorge,
Patel, and Zeckhauser, 1999). This finding is further substantiated by the results of
Burgstahler and Eames (2001).
Overall, there seems to be a widespread consensus among accountings
regulators, the financial press, investors, and researchers that firms manage earnings to
report a smooth and steady stream of consistently growing income with few earnings
surprises. On one hand, this reporting behavior involves understating the profits (by
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thereby creating a buffer of reserves that can be used when times are not so good. On
the other hand, it involves overstating the profits (by managing accruals upward) when
pre-managed earnings fall short of expectations, thus utilizing the reserves created in
good times. Both anecdotal and empirical evidence support the hypothesis that firms
engage in earnings smoothing.
Product recall forces the firm into a situation where they are faced with a
reduction in pre-managed earnings.27 The managers in this case have incentives to
persuade the market that the recall announcement was not a big setback for the firm.
They have incentives to relay the impression to the investors and the analysts that the
dent in the bottom line due to the recall was neither significant nor long-lasting. In
order to soften the blow of the recall announcement and to hide the current adverse
operating performance, managers have strong incentives to engage in income-increasing
earnings management around the time of the product recalls.
Based on this line of argument we hypothesize that firms announcing product
recalls have incentives to manage earnings upward in the quarter of and around the
product recall announcement. Stated differently, we expect the discretionary accruals
of recalling firms to be income-increasing and significantly positive at the time of and
around product recall announcements.
IV. A. 2. Big Bath Hypothesis

27

recalls.

See chapter III for a review of the empirical evidence on the economic impact of product
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bottom-line so intensely that the firm loses sight of their initial earnings target. Even
with the conceivable manipulation of discretionary accruals, the firm cannot meet
original expectations of the market. If this is the case, then managers might be tempted
to make the most of this situation and turn the financial adversity into an advantage by
taking a ‘big bath’. As explained in Chapter II, section C, the idea is to clean up their
balance sheets and create a buffer which can be used to artificially inflate the earnings
in future periods. On one hand, severe recalls bring misfortune to the firm, but on the
other hand, they provide an opportunity to ‘clean the decks’ and create a cushion of
reserves that can be exploited to reduce future expenses and enhance future income.
When one looks at the typical quarterly earnings announcement after a
significant product recall, one observes that the recalling firm’s management often
attributes the shortfall in earnings per share to the recall event. Thus, anecdotal
evidence suggests that at least some firms might use a recall as a scapegoat and take a
‘big bath’ behind the curtain of recall.
Section II C summarizes empirical and theoretical evidence favoring the big
bath hypothesis. Under normal circumstances, firms attempt to smooth earnings. But
when the news is ‘sufficiently bad’, managers understate the earnings even more and
take additional losses in order to report higher future earnings.
Thus, following this line of argument, we hypothesize that when firms face a
severe product recall, they prefer to take a ‘big bath’ and manage their earnings
downward. In other words, severe product recalls are generally “sufficiently bad news”
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in the quarter of recall.
IV. B. STATISTICAL METHODOLOGY
In order to test the hypotheses of earnings management developed in the
previous section, this study uses the cross-sectional version of the modified Jones
(1991) model, as adapted by Teoh et al. (1998 a and b). This model belongs to the class
of approaches which is broadly classified as total or aggregate accrual models. The
model attempts to decompose total accruals reported by a firm into normal (nondiscretionary or expected) and abnormal (discretionary or unexpected) components.
The normal or non-discretionary portion of accruals is considered to be driven by firmspecific economic variables like sales and level of investments in fixed assets. The
remaining portion of accruals which is unexplained by these economic variables is
considered to be arising from managerial discretion rather than a firm’s economic
fundamentals and is, therefore, treated as a proxy for the level of earnings management.
This section is organized as follows: The first part of this section provides the
necessary background and the underlying rationale for the Jones (1991) model. The
second part discusses the modification in the Jones (1991) model proposed by Dechow,
Sloan and Sweeney (1995) and the intuition behind it. The third part compares the
time-series and cross-sectional version of the model and justifies the selection of the
cross-sectional one for an event-specific earnings management study like this. The
fourth part presents arguments for decomposing accruals into current and long-term
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detailed step-by-step procedures for computing the accrual measures.
IV. B. 1. The Jones (1991) Model
Under the aggregate accruals approach, researchers attempt to isolate the
discretionary component of reported earnings and use it as a proxy for earnings
management. The earnings or net income figure is composed of two elements, that is,
cash flow from operations and total accruals.28 The cash flow component of earnings
reflects real or economic activities of a firm involving actual cash receipts or payments
and is generally less susceptible to manipulation by managers.29 Total accruals, on the
other hand, signify transactions that affect future operating cash flows rather than
current ones. Since the precise amount of future cash flows resulting from current
period activities is not known, managers must use their judgment in estimating the
amount of accruals to be included in the present year’s earnings. This flexibility
afforded to the managers under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
may result in opportunistic behavior on their part. Managers can both increase or
decrease current earnings by maneuvering accruals. For instance, in order to increase
current period earnings, managers may underestimate the provisions for bad and
doubtful debt. On the other hand, if decreasing current period earnings serves them
28

Total accruals for an accounting period consist of changes in non-cash working
capital minus depreciation charge for the period.
29

As mentioned earlier, although earnings can be managed through real activities (such
as timing asset sales, delaying maintenance, altering R&D expenditure), it is usually relatively
more costly and less convenient for managers to do that. Also, it is methodologically difficult
for the researchers to spot such manipulation (see Beneish, (2001) for a further discussion).
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current sales.
However, it does not mean that total accruals are entirely driven by managerial
discretion. According to Kaplan (1985), total accruals (or change in working capital
and depreciation) are determined by the economic environment of the firm as well as
management discretion. A portion of total accruals driven by economic conditions of
the firm is designated as non-discretionary or expected accruals. The remaining portion
of total accruals not explained by firm-specific fundamentals is regarded as
discretionary accrual subject to managerial manipulation. Discretionary accruals serve
as the proxy for earnings management.
Following this line of argument, Jones (1991) proposed an expectations model
that attempts to control for the economic conditions of the firm and thereby develop an
estimate of the expected or non-discretionary accrual. Under this expectations model,
total accruals are regressed on two firm specific variables: change in sales revenue and
the levels of depreciable assets. The two variables included in the model as regressors
are assumed to account for non-discretionary components of total accruals, that is, nondiscretionary working capital changes and non-discretionary depreciation. Change in
revenues30 are supposed to account for non-discretionary changes in working capital
accounts (like receivables or inventories), while the level of gross plant, property and
equipment is supposed to account for non-discretionary depreciation expense.

30

Jones (1991) implicitly assumed that revenues are exogenous or free from managers’
discretion. However, in many instances revenues themselves are prominent source of earnings
management. Jones also admitted this limitation of her model in her article.
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regression during the estimation period:
TACC j,t = α + β1 ∆REVj,t + β2 PPEj,t + εj,t

(1)

where:
TACC j,t = period t total accruals which are assumed to be non-discretionary
during the estimation period,
∆REV j,t = net revenues in period t minus revenues in period t-1, and
PPE j,t

= gross property, plant, and equipment in period t.

All variables, including the intercept, are scaled by total assets at the beginning
of the year. Total accruals are measured as changes in non-cash current assets minus
changes in current-liabilities (excluding current maturity of long-term debt) less the
depreciation expense for the period. Once the parameters estimates are obtained,
predicted values of accruals for the event period are estimated. These predicted values
are treated as expected or non-discretionary accruals. Event period discretionary
accruals are then the deviation of actual accruals from these benchmark nondiscretionary accruals.
IV. B. 2. The Modified Jones (1991) Model
As pointed out in footnote 17, the Jones (1991) model implicitly assumes that
revenues are non-discretionary or exogenous. This assumption lowers the power of the
model in that it fails to capture managed earnings arising from managed revenues.
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) argue that revenues (especially credit sales) can be
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modification in the original Jones model to capture earnings management through
discretionary revenues as well. They adjusted the change in revenues for change in
receivables in the event period, implicitly assuming that all changes in uncollected
credit sales at the end of an event period results from earnings management.
Specifically, in the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) modified Jones model, the nondiscretionary accruals in the event period are estimated as:
NDCACC j,t = a + b1 (∆REVj,t - ∆RECj,t) + b2 PPEj,t

(2)

where:
∆RECj,t = net receivables in year t minus net receivables in year t-1.
Note that the estimates (a, b1 and b2) of the model parameters (α, β1, β2) are still
obtained using the original Jones (1991) model (see Equation 1). Dechow et al. (1995)
further showed in their paper that the modified version of the Jones (1991) model tends
to outperform other models for detecting earnings management.
IV. B. 3. Time-series versus Cross-sectional Estimation
The modified Jones (1991) model has been used extensively in the earnings
management literature and is estimated in both a firm-specific, time-series manner and
in cross-sectional fashion. In the case of time-series models, parameters are estimated
for each firm in the sample separately using time-series of observations prior to the
event period. During this estimation period no systematic earnings management is
expected. Then discretionary accruals for the event period are obtained by deducting
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Finally, a test for statistical significance of discretionary accruals is conducted to prove
the earnings management hypothesis. In the cross-section modified Jones (1991)
model, however, the parameters are estimated by running a cross-sectional regression
using all firms in the same industry as the event firm, but excluding the event firm itself.
This cross-sectional regression is performed for each period around the event (including
the event period) during which earnings management is suspected. The rest of the
procedure is the same as in the time-series modified Jones (1991) model.
Clearly, the parameters and the measures of discretionary accruals obtained
from time-series and cross-sectional models are conceptually different from each other.
The time-series model measures discretionary accruals during the event period relative
to the level of normal accruals during the estimation period. It inherently assumes that
the estimation period is free from earnings management. The cross-sectional model
measures a firm’s discretionary accruals during the event period relative to the industry
norm. The level of accruals across firms in the same industry as the event firm serves
as the benchmark against which accruals of the event firm are compared. Only if the
discretionary accruals of the event firm are more extreme than those of other firms in
the industry, are they likely to be identified. This tendency of the cross-sectional
approach introduces a bias against finding evidence of earnings management, especially
in cases where the earnings management is expected to occur simultaneously across
many firms in the industry. Nevertheless, for studies attempting to measure the degree
of earnings management around a specific event (e.g., share repurchases, stock option
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advantages over its time-series counterpart. First, the cross-sectional approach enables
the researcher to control for earnings management attributable to factors other than the
event of interest, thus providing a clear focus on earnings management related to the
event of interest (in this case, product recall announcements). Second, it is easier to
obtain a reasonable number of observations using the cross-sectional approach. With
the time-series model, one needs to go back several years to assure that the sample size
is reasonable. Doing so introduces survivorship and selection bias in the time-series
model. Third, the cross-sectional version has been shown to be better specified than the
firm-specific time-series version (see e.g., Subramanyam, 1996). Finally, the researcher
does not have to impose the restrictive assumption of stationarity on the time-series
data.31
IV. B. 4. Annual versus Quarterly Estimates
This study employs quarterly observations for estimating discretionary accruals.
Both annual and quarterly accounting data have been extensively used in detecting
earnings management. However, studies focusing on earnings management around a
certain event are increasingly using quarterly rather than annual estimates of
discretionary accruals. There are a number of reasons for this trend. First, quarterly
data allows the researcher a sharper focus on earnings management around the event

31

See Defond and Jiambalvo (1994), Subramanyam (1996), Jeter and Shivakumar
(1999) for a more detailed comparison of the two approaches and the appropriateness of the
cross-sectional approach for detecting earnings management around a firm-specific event.
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accruals around the event more closely with the quarterly observations than with the
annual ones. Second, with the quarterly data, researchers have greater choices and
flexibility in choosing the “window” around the event during which they want to
investigate the presence of earnings management. Third, since researchers attempt to
detect earnings management in only a few quarters around the event, the chances that
the discretionary accruals are contaminated with effects of earnings management from
other events (like equity issues) are much less in the case of quarterly data. However,
with annual data, even if the researcher takes just a couple of years around the event, he
would end up with a relatively longer period of time during which it would be quite
difficult to control for the confounding effects. Lastly, although the annual figures are
always audited, three out of every four quarterly financial results are not audited. The
absence of an audit in these quarters allows the managers greater latitude to manage
earnings in them. Rangan (1998), for instance, finds that earnings management around
equity offerings is more obvious in quarterly statements than in annual ones.32 With
heightened opportunity to manage earnings in interim quarters, earnings management
around a specific event is less likely to escape the scrutiny of researchers.33

32

As one would suspect, an audit acts as a constraint on the manipulation of accruals.
Several studies document that audits (especially by reputable firms) work as a deterrent to
earnings management. See Chapter II, section C for a more detailed discussion on earnings
management constraints.
33

See Mendenhalls and Nichols (1988) and Jeter and Shivakumar (1999) for a more
detailed discussion on the relative merits and demerits of choosing quarterly estimations over
annual ones.
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In addition to segregating total accruals on the basis of management control (i.e.,
discretionary versus non-discretionary), Teoh et al. (1998 a and b) further partition the
accruals on the basis of time period (i.e., current versus long-term portions). Current
portion of accruals represents changes in current assets and liabilities related to the dayto-day activities, whereas long-term portion reflects changes in net fixed assets. Healy
(1985) and Sloan (1996) argue that long term accruals account for only modest
variation in total accruals. Guenther (1994), Jones (1999) and several other researchers
contend that current accruals capture the discretionary behavior better than aggregate
accruals. The justification for this contention is that current accruals are more
susceptible to managerial manipulation than long term accruals.
Furthermore, long-term discretionary accruals are less likely to reflect periodspecific earnings management, which is of critical importance in an event-specific
earnings management investigation. However, the most compelling reason for focusing
on current accruals rather than long-term or total accruals comes from the data
availability constraints. Two main items necessary for computing total as well as longterm accruals (i.e., Gross plant, property and equipment and the corresponding
depreciation expense) are missing from the Compustat quarterly files for a significant
portion of our sample. Even when these items are available for recalling firms, their
unavailability for a considerable number of other firms used in cross-sectional
regressions in the expectations model causes the parameters estimates to be less
reliable. Despite these problems, we still report our results from the long-term accruals
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of current discretionary accruals of the recalling firms remains our focal point.
IV. B. 6. Detailed Procedures for Computation of Discretionary Accruals:
Below is the step-by-step procedure used to compute our measures of earnings
management. Note that we define the quarter in which a recall announcement was
made in the Wall Street Journal as quarter (0). In other words, Q(0), is the quarter of
first earnings announcement after the recall. Consequently, quarter -1 is the quarter of
latest earnings announcement prior to the recall.
Step 1: Compute Current Accruals (CACCj,t) as:
CACCj,t = (∆CAj,t − ∆CLj,t − ∆CASHj,t + ∆STDEBTj,t)

(3)

where:
∆CAj,t

= firm j’s change in current assets (Compustat item #40) from
quarter t-1 to quarter t,

∆CLj,t

= firm j’s change in current liabilities (Compustat item #49) from
quarter t-1 to quarter t,

∆CASHj,t

= firm j’s change in cash and cash equivalents (Compustat item
#36) from quarter t-1 to quarter t, and

∆STDEBTj,t = firm j’s change in short-term debt (Compustat item #45)
included in current liabilities from quarter t-1 to quarter t.
Step 2: Estimate the coefficients of the cross-sectional regression model for
current accruals:
CACC j ,t
TA j ,t −1

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆REV j ,t
⎟ + β1 ⎜
= α⎜
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜ TA
j , t −1
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝

⎞
⎟ + ε j ,t
⎟
⎠

(4)
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j firms belong in the same 2-digit SIC code as the recalling firm,
TAj,t-1

= firm j’s book value of total assets (Compustat item #44) at the
beginning of quarter t, and

∆REVj,t = firm j’s change in revenues (Compustat #2) from quarter t-1 to
quarter t.
Note that all the variables as well as the intercept are scaled by total assets at the
beginning of the quarter. This OLS regression is estimated for the entire test period,
that is, each quarter from Q(-4) to Q(+4) including the quarter of event, i.e., Q(0). Each
of these cross-sectional regressions uses all firms in the same 2-digit SIC code as the
recalling firm (except, of course, the recalling firm itself).34 In order to ensure
reliability, the above estimation is made only if for a particular recall there are at least
ten observations in the corresponding 2-digit SIC code.
Step 3: Calculate the non-discretionary current accruals for each quarter in the
test period [Q(-4) to Q(+4)], using the parameter estimates obtained
from the intra-industry cross-sectional regression in Equation (4):
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆REV j ,t − ∆REC j ,t
⎟ + βˆ1 ⎜
NDCACC j ,t = αˆ ⎜
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜
TA j ,t −1
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

(5)

where:
NDCACC j,t = Non-discretionary current accruals, scaled by lagged assets for
firm j in quarter t,

34

Matching with the 2-digit SIC code is consistent with the methodology adopted in
previous research. Earlier attempts by researchers to go down to finer levels of SIC
classifications resulted in significantly limiting the sample.
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= Net receivables (Compustat item #37) in quarter t minus net
receivables in quarter t-1, and

α̂ , β̂1

= Estimates of α, β1 obtained from Equation (4) in step 2.

Step 4: Calculate discretionary current accruals as:
DCACC j ,t =

CACC j ,t
TA j ,t −1

− NDCACC j ,t

(6)

where:
DCACC j,t

= Discretionary current accruals, scaled by lagged assets for firm
j in quarter t.

Step 5: Next, to decompose the long-term accruals into their discretionary and
non-discretionary components, first estimate the total accruals
(TACCj,t) as:
TACC j,t

= CACCj,t − DEPNj,t

(7)

where:
DEPN j,t = firm j’s depreciation and amortization expense (Compustat item
#5) in quarter t.
Step 6: Then, estimate the parameters of the following cross-sectional
regression:
TACC j ,t
TA j ,t −1

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆REV j ,t
⎟ + b1 ⎜
= a⎜
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜ TA
j ,t −1
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝

⎞
⎛ PPE j ,t
⎟ + b2 ⎜
⎟
⎜ TA
j ,t −1
⎠
⎝

⎞
⎟ + ε j ,t
⎟
⎠

where:
PPEj,t = firm j’s gross value of property, plant and equipment (Compustat
item #118) in quarter t.

(8)
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firms in the same two digit SIC code as the recalling firm (except the recalling firm) are
included in this estimation model.
Step 7: Calculate the non-discretionary total accruals for each quarter in the
test period, using the parameter estimates obtained from the regression
in equation (7):
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆REV j ,t − ∆REC j ,t
⎟ + bˆ1 ⎜
NDTACC j ,t = aˆ ⎜
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜
TA j ,t −1
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝

⎞
⎛ PPE j ,t
⎟ + bˆ2 ⎜
⎟
⎜ TA
j ,t −1
⎠
⎝

⎞
⎟
⎟
⎠

(9)

where:
NDTACC j,t = Non-discretionary total accruals, scaled by lagged assets for
firm j in quarter t, and
â , b̂1 , b̂2

= Estimates of a, b1, b2 obtained from equation (7) in step 6.

Step 8: Calculate discretionary total accruals as:
DTACC j ,t =

TACC j ,t
TA j ,t −1

− NDTACC j ,t

(10)

where:
DTACC j,t

=

Discretionary total accruals, scaled by lagged assets for firm j
in quarter t.

Step 9: Calculate non-discretionary long-term accruals as:
NDLACC j,t =

NDTACC j,t - NDCACC j,t

(11)

NDLACC j,t =

Non-discretionary long-term accruals, scaled by lagged assets
for firm j in quarter t.

where:
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DLACC j ,t =

TACC j ,t − CACC j ,t
TA j ,t −1

− NDLACC j ,t

(12)

where:
DLACC j,t

=

Discretionary long-term accruals, scaled by lagged assets for
firm j in quarter t.

After computing the discretionary current and long-term accruals (our proxies
for earnings management), we turn our attention to conducting the tests for their
statistical significance. We conduct a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test to examine
whether the discretionary accruals for the announcing firms are significantly different
from zero. Also, we conduct a parametric two-tailed t-test and non-parametric sign test
for the statistical significance of announcing firms’ discretionary accruals.

CHAPTER V
EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Chapter V begins with the description of the sample of recall firms investigated
in this study. Next, section B explores the profile of net income around recalls. Section
C presents empirical findings on the behavior of discretionary accruals based on the
modified Jones (1991) model around product recalls. Section D discusses an important
shortcoming of the modified Jones (1991) model in the investigation of earnings
management around events like product recalls. Section E attempts to resolve the
shortcoming by suggesting a modification in the model to capture the discretionary
accruals more precisely. Finally, section F discusses the results of the proposed models.
V. A. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION
In this section we present the sampling strategy and data sources employed in
this study. More specifically, we describe the nature and characteristics of recall events
that qualify for inclusion in our sample as well as the rationale behind the sample
screening procedures. Toward the end of this section we present a statistical profile of
the firms that make it to the final sample
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This study covers product recall announcements that receive sufficient publicity
in the trade press. As mentioned earlier in section III, recalls can range from being very
minor (having no significant economic impact on the firm) to extremely consequential
(resulting in severe economic damage to the firm). Previous recall studies show that
severe type recalls which get coverage in the financial press are associated with
significantly negative economic effects. Our hypotheses of earnings management apply
to these types of recalls, which constitute major economic events for the firm.
Since our sample consists of recalls reported by the media (specifically the Wall
Street Journal), it is pertinent to evaluate the attributes of such recall announcements.
Rupp (2001) analyzes the characteristics of newsworthy recalls using the Wall Street
Journal coverage as a proxy for such recalls. He analyzed safety-related recalls by
automobile manufacturers over the 1973- 1998 period. Using a standard probit model,
the author finds that recalls involving a larger number of vehicles and recalls
categorized as high hazard by the NHTSA have a significantly high probability of being
reported by the media. As expected, placard recalls (defined in footnote 7) are much
less likely to receive media attention. Remember that our hypothesis relates earnings
management to economically important safety-related recalls. Since the Wall Street
Journal’s coverage is capturing these constructs well, our focus on the Wall Street
Journal reported recalls is justified.
This study covers recall announcements reported by the Wall Street Journal
from January 1990 through December 2003. We exclude vehicle recalls monitored by

-63the NHTSA from our sample for the following reasons. First, the automotive industry
has the highest frequency of recalls during the sample period. The inclusion of
automobile recalls would cause our sample to heavily tilt toward the auto industry
which, in turn, would cause the results to be less generalizable across the recalls in
different industries. Second, the vast majority of these recalls are announced by the
three major domestic automakers. It can be argued that if recall announcements for a
particular industry or firm are quite regular and frequent, investors incorporate the
expectations of a recall in their valuation models, causing the recall to lose its economic
significance. Since our earnings management hypotheses apply to recalls that are both
economically significant and relatively unexpected, automotive recalls can potentially
confound the effects on discretionary accruals. Third, automotive recalls are highly
concentrated in time. It is typical for General Motors or Ford to have more than two to
three major recalls in a single year. Since our research examines the behavior of
discretionary accruals in four quarters before and after the announcement date, recalls
which are concentrated in time must be removed to avoid time interval overlap
problems.
Table 1 reports the year-wise details of the remaining sample screening
procedures. Our initial sample consists of 282 non-automotive recalls reported by the
Wall Street Journal during the 14 year period starting from January 1, 1990 and ending
on December 31, 2003. Out of these 282 recalls, 36 recalls are eliminated because of
involvement of more than one firm in the recall process. These joint recalls include
those by retailing firms which generally share the losses related to product recalls with

Table 1: Sample Selection Procedures

Sample Selection:

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Total

%:

Non-Auto Recalls
Reported by WSJ

17

18

11

13

24

11

16

21

27

37

37

23

12

15

282

100

(2)
15

(2)
16

11

(2)
11

(4)
20

11

(1)
15

(2)
19

(5)
22

(6)
31

(10)
27

(2)
21

12

15

(36)
246

(13)
87

(4)
11

(4)
12

11

(3)
8

(6)
14

(4)
7

(6)
9

(5)
14

(9)
13

(12)
19

(7)
20

(4)
17

(4)
8

(7)
8

(75)
171

(27)
61

(6)
5

(2)
10

11

(2)
6

(6)
8

(1)
6

(3)
6

(5)
9

(8)
5

(7)
12

(11)
9

(7)
10

(1)
7

(3)
5

(62)
109

(22)
39

(1)
4

(1)
9

(4)
7

(1)
5

(1)
7

(1)
5

6

(2)
7

(1)
4

(2)
10

9

(2)
8

7

(3)
2

(19)
90

(7)
32

(2)
2

(1)
8

(3)
4

(1)
4

(1)
6

5

6

(2)
5

4

10

9

8

7

2

(10)
80

(4)
28

2

(1)
7

4

4

(2)
4

5

(2)
4

(3)
2

(1)
3

10

(4)
5

(3)
5

(1)
6

2

(17)
63

(6)
22

-Recalls by Retailers
Other Joint Recalls
-Recalls by Foreign
or Private Firms
-2 or More Recalls
Within a Year
-Recalls of Software,
Videos, Books, and
Promotional Stuff
-Missing CA Data
Final Sample for
CA Model
-Missing LTA Data:
Final Sample for
LTA Model
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Notes: The initial sample consists of non-auto recalls reported by the WSJ. Joint recalls, those by retailers, private and
foreign firms are excluded from the initial set. Further, more than one recall within a span of a year are also dropped. Next,
recalls of unusual items like software, videos logos, and promotion stuff are excluded. Finally, those firms for which the
necessary data for the current accruals model or long-term accruals model were not available on the quarterly Compustat
files were dropped.

-65manufacturers of the recalled products. Second, joint recalls also include recalls that
affect two or more firms within the same industry. Such recalls generally apply to an
entire product category rather than a particular brand manufactured by one firm. Since
the effects of such recalls may be spread over several firms, the reporting behavior of
firms involved is likely to be different from that of a firm shouldering the burden of a
full blown recall all by itself.
Another 75 recalls by private and foreign firms are also excluded from the
sample. Included in this category of elimination are recalls by firms whose stocks trade
as Pink sheet stocks and ADRs. The financial reporting process of such firms is not
subject to compliance with U.S. GAAP or SEC regulations. Since the reporting
requirements for these firms are different, their earnings management behavior may be
quite distinct from domestic, listed firms.
Also excluded from the sample are instances where one firm is engaged in two
or more recalls within a year. In such cases, it is difficult to attribute earnings
management to a single recall announcement due to time interval overlap problems.
This step screens out another 62 recall announcements from the sample.
Another category of exclusion consists of recalls of unusual items like audios,
videos, software, recipe books, logos, and promotional material. Recall of such items
differs from the recall of more traditional products in a number of ways. Not only is the
nature of costs associated with such recalls quite unique, but the rate of consumer
response to recall announcement of such products is also fairly low. Inclusion of such

-66recalls in the final sample is likely to blur the profile of a typical safety-related recall
which is the object of investigation in this study.
Finally, we exclude the recalls for which the necessary data to compute our
measures of earnings management is not available from the Compustat quarterly files.
Each of the two measures of earnings management used in this study (i.e., current
discretionary accruals and long-term discretionary accruals) has unique data
requirements. Therefore, the final sample size differs for the two measures. For the
discretionary current accruals computations, another 10 recalls are omitted from the
final sample for lack of essential quarterly data. For the discretionary long-term
accruals, 17 more recalls are dropped because of data requirements (chiefly the missing
quarterly depreciation expense). However, two exceptions were made here in order to
prevent the loss of valuable observations from the analysis. First, there were several
firms for which the gross plant, property and equipment figures were reported only at
annual or semi-annual frequency. For such instances, the quarterly figures were
estimated by way of simple linear interpolation. Similarly, for the recalling firms for
which the quarterly receivable balances were not available (primarily because they are
combined with other figures), we assumed that there was no change in receivables.
Altogether, there were no more than 18 observations for which these items had to be
inferred. This strategy facilitated salvaging vital data points without risking
contamination of data with unwarranted conjectures. Thus, our final sample size for the
discretionary current accruals model is 80 and that for the long-term accruals model is
63.

-67V. A. 2. Sample Distribution and Characteristics:
Tables 2 and 3 summarize the key features and characteristics of the final
sample. Panel A in Table 2 presents the industry-wise distribution of the recalling firms
in our sample. The distribution here closely follows the incidence of recalls across
various industries (except for the noticeable omissions of the automotive and retail
industries which are not covered by this study). As one would expect, industries where
product-related safety issues are most pronounced are the ones that are highly
vulnerable to product recalls and therefore constitute the majority of the sample.
Specifically, four major industry groups, that is, Food (SIC 20), Chemical and Allied
(SIC 28), Industrial Equipment (SIC 35), and Scientific Instruments (SIC 38)
collectively account for 58 out of 80 recalls covered in this study (almost three-fourths
of the entire sample). Pharmaceutical Preparations (SIC 2834) is the single most
represented industry in the sample (contributing over 16% of the observations of the
sample). Overall there are 38 different (four-digit) SIC industries covered by the
sample.
Table 2, Panel B summarizes the year-wise distribution of the final sample.
Although the study spans fourteen years (from 1990 to 2003), the four year period from
1999 to 2003 accounts for over 42% of the recalls. Higher frequencies of recalls
reported by the media during this period could be attributable to a greater public interest
in recalls or tougher enforcement of safety standards ensuing some of the biggest and
most infamous recalls in corporate history (e.g., Coca-Cola’s recall in 1999 across
Europe and Ford/Firestone recall in 2000). The remaining recalls are distributed
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Sample Distribution and Characteristics

Panel A: Sample Distribution by Industry
SIC Code
20
22
23
26
28
30
34
35
36
37
38
39
73
80

Industry:
Food Products
Textile Mills Products
Apparel and Other fabric based Products
Paper and Allied Products
Chemicals and Allied Products
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products
Fabricated Metal Products
Industry Machinery and Equipment
Electronic and Other Electric Equipment
Transportation Equipment
Instruments and related Products
Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries
Business Services
Health Services

Frequency:
16
1
1
2
15
3
2
14
5
1
13
3
2
2

%:
20.0
1.3
1.3
2.5
18.8
3.8
2.5
17.5
6.3
1.3
16.3
3.8
2.5
2.5

Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year
Year:
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003

Frequency:
2
8
4
4
6
5
6
5
4
10
9
8
7
2

%:
2.5
10.0
5.0
5.0
7.5
6.3
7.5
6.3
5.0
12.5
11.3
10.0
8.8
2.5

Cumulative Freq.:
2
10
14
18
24
29
35
40
44
54
63
71
78
80

Cumulative %
2.5
12.5
17.5
22.5
30.0
36.3
43.8
50.0
55.0
67.5
78.8
88.8
97.5
100.0

-69relatively evenly over remaining years in the sample.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for key size and performance variables
of the sample firms. Mean and median book values of total assets for the sample firms
are $8,477 million and $5,198 million, respectively. Mean and median market values of
equities are $14,677 million and $4,688 million, respectively. These figures show that
firms in our recall sample are relatively large. Past studies on product recalls have
found similar size statistics indicating one of the following possibilities: (1) larger
firms tend to have a higher frequency of recalls and (2) the WSJ, or more generally, the
financial press, tends to have greater coverage of recalls by large public firms that are
likely to generate greater public interest. These figures along with the statistics of
variability reveal that sample firms vary considerably in asset size and market value of
equity35.
Performance statistics reported in Table 3 are for the quarter preceding the
quarter of recall. Mean and median quarterly earnings are $137 and $56 million,
respectively. Sales growth, which is defined as change in sales in Q (-1) scaled by total
assets at the end of Q (-2), is positive and averages 1.2%. These numbers show that the
firms in the sample are, on average, profitable.

35

One observation viz. Cisco Systems strongly influences the mean and variability
statistics. Around the time of recall (start of quarter I, 2000), Cisco had market capitalization of
a whopping $ 366 billion, at least 8 standard deviations above the sample mean. At that time
the Cisco stock (which is hovering around $ 20 at present) was trading at an amazing $ 130.

Table 3:

Size and Performance Characteristics for Recall Sample

Mean:

Std. Dev.:

Minimum:

1st
Quartile:

Median:

3rd
Quartile:

Maximum:

8,477.0

13,959.7

14.3

938.5

5,198.0

11,075.2

85,713.0

14,676.8

42,268.2

7.7

777.6

4,687.6

14,962.2

366,498.3

Book Value of Equity

3,172.6

4,809.4

-153.8

207.3

1,461.9

4,148.1

27,219.0

Sales

2,226.9

3,052.9

0.8

216.0

1,320.9

3,147.4

19,896.0

Sales Growth

1.2%

6.8%

-20.0%

-1.3%

0.7%

3.1%

28.7%

Earnings

137.2

267.7

-740.0

1.3

56.2

263.2

1,231.0

Return on Assets

1.1%

4.4%

-26.8%

0.4%

1.7%

3.1%

6.7%

Return on Equity

1.2%

42.2%

-338.0%

0.9%

4.3%

7.1%

106.0%

Variables:
Total Assets
Market Value of Equity

Size and performance statistics are measured in millions of dollars. Sales, earnings and returns are quarterly variables
measured for Q (-1), that is, last reporting quarter before the recall announcement. Likewise, book value of assets and equity
as well as market value of equity are as of the end of Q (-1). Sales growth is the change in revenue in Q (-1) scaled by book
value of total assets at the end of Q (-2).
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-71V. B. OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF RECALLING FIRMS
Once we have analyzed the distribution of our sample, we take a closer look at the
behavior of earnings around product recalls in order to develop an appreciation of how
recalls affect the net income performance of firms. Specifically, we look at the timeseries profile of quarterly net income scaled by prior total assets in quarter -4 through
quarter +4 around the recall. Results of this initial analysis are reported in Table 4.
Three different measures of net income performance are analyzed. The first
measure is simply the quarterly net income deflated by the book value of total assets at
the beginning of the quarter. The second measure shows the change in asset-scaled net
income from the previous quarter. The third one measures abnormal income using a
seasonal random walk model. Abnormal income is defined as the deviation of a
quarter’s scaled income from that of the corresponding quarter in the previous year.
Table 4 reports the mean and median for the three measures mentioned above. The
statistical significance is based on the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test for the
median and a parametric two-tailed t-test for the mean.
Overall, recalling firms have positive net income in and around the quarter of
recall. However, the statistical significance of mean scaled income of recalling firms
starts dropping in the quarter of recall and continues to drop in the subsequent quarters.
On the other hand, median scaled net income remains positive and significant
throughout the period of analysis. This trend in the scaled net income indicates that
recalls have a sharp negative effect on the income of at least some firms in the sample.
Next, we analyze the change in scaled net income from the previous quarter. As shown
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Quarter

Net Income Performance of Firms around Product Recalls

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

1.89**

1.69**

1.42**

Net Income Around Recalls:
Median

1.93**

1.58**

1.76**

1.78**

1.82**

1.80**

Mean
Sample
Size

1.16*

1.61**

0.89**

1.24**

1.04*

0.89

0.95

0.78

0.41

80

80

79

79

80

80

80

80

80

Recalling Firms’ Change in Net Income from Previous Quarter:
Median

-

-0.35

-0.31

0.59

0.21

-0.26

-0.51

0.16

0.10

Mean
Sample
Size

-

-0.71

-0.85

0.51

0.77

3.11

-4.12

0.97

-0.20

-

80

79

79

79

80

80

80

80

Recalling Firms’ Abnormal Net Income:
Median

0.02

-0.07

-0.12*

-0.13

-0.18*

-0.01

-0.01

0.02

-0.03

Mean
Sample
Size

-1.17*

0.08

-0.35

-0.75*

-0.12

-0.72

0.06

-0.46

-0.63

72

78

78

79

80

80

79

79

80

Net income is quarterly net income after extraordinary items and discontinued
operations.
Abnormal net income is computed using seasonal random-walk model. It is the
difference between current quarter’s net income and net income of last year’s
corresponding quarter.
** and * denote significance at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Statistical
significance is based on the Wilcoxon signed rank test for the median, and a parametric
t-test for the mean. All measures of net income are scaled by the beginning of the
quarter book value of total assets, and are reported as percentage.

-73in Table 4, none of the quarters shows significant change in net income from the
previous quarter. This pattern is apparently consistent with the smoothing hypothesis.
Finally, we look at the abnormal income of recalling firms based on the seasonal
random walk model. When earnings of the previous year’s corresponding quarter is
taken as a benchmark, recalling firms seem to under-perform in the quarters around a
recall. Abnormal income is significantly negative in the quarter of the event and several
of the quarters around the event. After adjusting for seasonality, the negative effect of
recalls on earnings becomes more discernable. This pattern is in apparent contradiction
to the smoothing hypothesis.
V. C. TEST FOR THE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT HYPOTHESIS
After initial inspection of net income profiles, we turn our attention to
estimating current abnormal accruals, the main proxy for earnings management used in
this study. Table 5 reports summary statistics for cross-sectional OLS regressions based
on the current accruals version of the Jones (1991) model. Means and standard
deviations (in parenthesis) of parameter estimates, their t-statistics, the number of firms
in each regression, and the regular and adjusted R2 are reported for each quarter covered
by the analysis.
The average coefficient for the change in revenue is positive for all quarters
except quarter (-2). The t-statistics for the slope coefficients are significant (at the 5%
level) and positive for at least 50% of the cases in each quarter. This shows that
generally the effect of changes in current assets (such as receivables) dominates that of
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Summary Statistics for the Expected Current Accruals Model

Descriptive statistics are presented for the Expected Current Accruals Model. It is
based on the Jones (1991) model, as adapted by Teoh et al. (1998 a and b):
CACC j ,t
TAj ,t −1

CACCj,t
TAj,t-1
∆REVj,t

εj,t
Quarter

α
t-statistic

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆REV j ,t ⎞
⎟ + β1 ⎜
⎟ + ε j ,t
= α⎜
⎜ TA ⎟
⎜ TA
⎟
j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝

= firm j’s change in working capital excluding cash and short term
debt from quarter t-1 to quarter t,
= firm j’s total assets at the beginning of quarter t,
= firm j’s change in revenues between quarter t-1 and quarter t,
= Error term for firm j in quarter t.

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

-0.031

0.040

-0.041

0.016

-0.007

0.005

-0.013

0.017

0.040

(0.366)

(0.298)

(0.169)

(0.159)

(0.101)

(0.155)

(0.139)

(0.157)

(0.221)

-1.823

2.651

-6.484

-2.043

1.689

0.426

-2.323

-0.432

-2.106

(14.538) (42.967) (30.049) (13.731) (22.580) (18.789) (13.591) (28.411) (29.578)

β1
t-statistic

0.178

0.288

-0.178

0.193

0.231

0.257

0.221

0.105

0.217

(0.400)

(0.787)

(1.792)

(0.477)

(0.837)

(0.476)

(0.842)

(0.588)

(1.094)

2.122

4.076

1.225

4.348

3.608

4.890

3.440

1.791

3.613

(9.904)

(14.513)

337.20

336.79

(4.596)
324.78

N

(17.737) (13.860) (17.376) (14.943) (17.265) (10.746)
328.59

331.10

332.21

335.34

334.18

335.71

(178.33) (180.03) (181.68) (182.26) (184.13) (185.42) (186.60) (187.53) (188.50)

R

2

2

Adj. R

0.214

0.279

0.285

0.228

0.255

0.300

0.297

0.312

0.347

(0.240)

(0.298)

(0.314)

(0.274)

(0.276)

(0.299)

(0.294)

(0.313)

(0.306)

0.206

0.271

0.278

0.220

0.248

0.294

0.290

0.305

0.340

(0.242)

(0.302)

(0.318)

(0.277)

(0.279)

(0.301)

(0.296)

(0.316)

(0.309)

Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported for model coefficients and
goodness of fit statistics for each quarter covered by the analysis.

-75changes in current liabilities (such as payables) which is in line with expectations. The
average number of firms in each cross-sectional regression is well above 300. The
minimum number of observations in any regression is 25. The average adjusted R2
ranges between 0.21 and 0.34.
Now we turn to the estimation of the discretionary current accruals of the model
- the proxy for earnings management in this study. Discretionary current accruals for
recalling firms are calculated as the difference between the actual current accruals and
expected or predicted accruals from the current accruals expectation model. Under the
modified Jones (1991) model used in this study, change in revenues is taken net of
change in receivables when estimating the predicted accruals.
Under the null hypothesis of no earnings management, the mean and median
discretionary current accruals are expected to be statistically insignificant. Further, the
signs of discretionary current accruals are expected to be evenly distributed between
positives and negatives. Positive and significant mean or median discretionary current
accruals would be indicative of upward or income-increasing earnings management.
Negative and significant discretionary current accruals are suggestive of downward or
income-decreasing earnings management.
Table 6 reports descriptive statistics for the discretionary current accruals and
the results from the test of the hypothesis on earnings management for eighty recalling
firms in the sample. Both parametric and non-parametric tests are employed to test the
statistical significance of discretionary current accruals. Table 6 reports the p-values for

Table 6:

Discretionary Current Accruals around Recalls Based on the Current Accruals Version of the Modified Jones
(1991) Model
Quarter:

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

-0.99

1.39

0.27

1.08

-1.93

1.28

0.76

0.50

-1.27

(0.177)

(0.024)

(0.651)

(0.103)

(0.017)

(0.038)

(0.132)

(0.378)

(0.076)

-0.22

0.33

0.44

0.70

-1.32

0.67

0.56

0.80

-0.73

(0.571)

(0.096)

(0.608)

(0.100)

(0.006)

(0.142)

(0.207)

(0.082)

(0.046)

37/43

43/37

42/38

43/37

30/50

46/34

46/34

47/33

34/46

(0.576)

(0.576)

(0.738)

(0.576)

(0.033)

(0.219)

(0.219)

(0.146)

(0.219)

Statistics:
Mean:
Parametric t-test (p-value):
Median:
Sign Rank Test (p-value):
Positive/Negative:
Binomial Sign Test (p-value):

Discretionary current accruals for firms announcing product recalls are calculated as prediction errors from current accruals.
The expectation model is based on the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model, as adapted by Teoh et al. (1998 a and b).
CACC j ,t
TA j ,t −1

CACCj,t
TAj,t-1
∆REVj,t

εj,t

=
=
=
=

⎛ ∆REV j ,t
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎟ + β1 ⎜
= α⎜
⎟
⎜ TA
⎜ TA
j , t −1
⎝
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠

⎞
⎟ + ε j ,t
⎟
⎠

firm j’s change in working capital excluding cash and short term debt from quarter t-1 to quarter t,
firm j’s total assets at the beginning of quarter t,
firm j’s change in revenues between quarter t-1 and quarter t,
error term.
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Discretionary current accruals are reported as percentage of the book value of total assets at the beginning of the quarter. All
p-values reported here are for a two tailed test. Values significant at the 10% level are reported in bold face.

-77the parametric t-test, Wilcoxon signed rank test and the binomial sign test along with
mean, median and frequencies for positive and negative discretionary current accruals.
Overall, the results reported in Table 6 exhibit evidence of income-decreasing
earnings management in the quarter of recalls. Only for the quarter of recall, that is,
quarter 0, discretionary current accruals are significantly different from zero (at the 5%
level) as indicated by the p-values for all three statistical tests. In the quarter of recall,
50 out of 80 firms have negative discretionary current accruals, which results in a pvalue of 0.033 for the sign test. The mean for discretionary current accruals in the
quarter of recall is -1.93, which has a p-value of 0.017 for the parametric t-test. The
median discretionary accrual for quarter 0 is -1.32, which is significant at the 1% level
under the Wilcoxon signed rank test. Evidence presented in Table 6 shows that
managers resort to income-decreasing earnings management in the quarter of bad news.
This finding is in line with the big bath hypothesis and in conflict with the smoothing
hypothesis. Firms, rather than attempting to smooth income by managing accruals
upward, tend to manage them downward under the cover of bad news. According to
Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002), firms tend to take a ‘big bath’ and under-report
earnings when faced with sufficiently bad news. Under this argument, severe recalls
seem to constitute sufficiently bad news for most firms.
Other than the quarter of recall, the mean discretionary current accruals are
significant in quarters -3 and +1. In these quarters, the sign of discretionary current
accruals is positive, which is indicative of upward earnings management. However,
non-parametric test statistics turn out to be insignificant for these quarters. This

-78tendency could be a result of aggressive upward earnings management around recalls on
the part of a few firms in order to improve the overall performance for the fiscal year in
which the recall took place. For quarter +1, a significant and positive mean can also be
interpreted as reversal of income-decreasing discretionary current accrual found in the
recall quarter.
There is another noticeable pattern that emerges in table 6. Mean and median
discretionary current accruals have positive signs in the three quarters preceding the
quarter of recall and the three quarters following the quarter of recall. This pattern is
suggestive of upward earnings management in the quarters around quarter of recall
announcement. But since the discretionary current accruals generally turn out to be
statistically insignificant in these quarters (with the exceptions mentioned above), they
cannot be taken as a firm evidence of upward earnings management.
Next, we estimate long-term discretionary accruals. In order to do that, we run
cross-sectional regressions based on the full version of the modified Jones (1991)
model, as outlined in section IV. C. 6. Table 7 reports summary statistics for these
regressions.
The average slope coefficients for the change in revenue have the expected sign
and are significant in most cases. The expected sign for gross plant, property and
equipment is negative, which is consistent with increases in the level of fixed assets
being associated with higher depreciation expense – an income-decreasing accrual. The
average number of firms in each full model regression is considerably less than that in
the current accruals model. This outcome is mainly because of the higher frequency of
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Summary Statistics for the Expected Total Accruals Model

The total Accruals Model from which long term expected accruals are obtained is based
on the Jones (1991) model:

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆REV j ,t ⎞
⎛ PPE j ,t ⎞
⎟ + b1 ⎜
⎟ + b2 ⎜
⎟ + ε j ,t
= a⎜
⎟
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜ TA
TA j ,t −1
j ,t −1 ⎠
j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝
⎝
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠
TACC j,t = firm j’s change in working capital excluding cash and short term
debt from quarter t-1 to quarter t minus depreciation for quarter t,
= firm j’s total assets at the beginning of quarter t,
TAj,t-1
∆REVj,t
= firm j’s change in revenues between quarter t-1 and quarter t,
PPEj,t
= firm j’s gross value of property, plant and equipment in quarter t,
εj,t
= Error term for firm j in quarter t.
TACC j ,t

Quarter

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

-0.004

0.082

-0.046

0.030

-0.002

-0.026

-0.005

0.015

0.040

(0.531)

(0.547)

(0.157)

(0.205)

(0.130)

(0.286)

(0.155)

(0.224)

(0.240)

t-statistic -1.584

-0.470

-6.839

3.861

9.423

10.648

-2.168

-2.249

0.935

a

(13.713) (28.077) (16.183) (43.297) (58.224) (59.722) (17.575) (30.923) (47.898)
0.212

0.307

0.092

0.277

0.031

0.131

0.141

0.219

0.074

(0.434)

(0.886)

(0.788)

(0.842)

(1.109)

(1.099)

(0.723)

(0.722)

(1.537)

3.852

2.428

3.761

1.570

4.445

2.844

1.976

2.266

(5.411)

(17.079)

(7.929)

(16.964)

(5.583)

(16.706)

(6.634)

(7.036)

(16.591)

-0.030

-0.024

-0.049

-0.103

0.007

-0.047

-0.031

-0.077

-0.015

(0.123)

(0.125)

(0.168)

(0.623)

(0.138)

(0.169)

(0.141)

(0.451)

(0.161)

t-statistic -0.944

-1.682

-2.049

-2.067

-1.757

-1.899

-0.919

-1.446

-4.417

(4.003)

(2.633)

(12.710)

(7.443)

(8.256)

(3.635)

(5.461)

(5.213)

(18.097)

210.35

213.59

211.45

203.89

208.45

214.23

212.81

207.44

206.53

b1

t-statistic 2.318

b2

N

(124.39) (127.59) (129.31) (122.68) (125.64) (130.48) (135.07) (129.17) (130.01)

R2
Adj. R2

0.285

0.325

0.331

0.277

0.301

0.343

0.353

0.369

0.414

(0.275)

(0.287)

(0.328)

(0.298)

(0.289)

(0.313)

(0.288)

(0.319)

(0.347)

0.268

0.309

0.316

0.259

0.285

0.328

0.335

0.352

0.399

(0.280)

(0.294)

(0.335)

(0.307)

(0.295)

(0.318)

(0.295)

(0.326)

(0.354)

Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported for model coefficients and
goodness of fit statistics for each quarter covered by the analysis.

-81missing depreciation and gross plant, property and equipment figures at the quarterly
level in the Compustat database.
Table 8 reports the results from the test of significance of the long-term
discretionary accruals. None of the reported p-values are significant at the 5% level.
Only the mean discretionary long-term accruals are significant at the 10% level for
quarter 0, and the variable has a negative sign. This result is only a weak indication that
some firms might be managing long-term discretionary accruals downward in the recall
quarter. Overall, there seems to be little or no evidence of earnings management from
the results reported in Table 8. This finding is consistent with the arguments made by
Guenther (1994), Jones (1999), and several other researchers who contend that current
accruals capture the discretionary behavior better than long-term accruals.
In general, evidence presented in this section favors the big bath hypothesis over
the smoothing hypothesis. However, before drawing firm conclusions from our
findings in this section, we look at some potential shortcomings of the Jones (1991)
model, especially in the context of events like product recalls, that can cast doubt on our
findings.
V. D. A LIMITATION OF EXPECTED ACCRUALS MODEL IN DETECTING
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AROUND PRODUCT RECALLS
Unlike most other events investigated in the context of earnings management
(like management buyouts, equity issue, and mergers), product recalls have a direct

Table 8:

Discretionary Long-term Accruals around Recalls Based on the Modified Jones (1991) Model
Quarter:

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

0.32

0.44

2.05

8.04

-3.37

1.80

0.72

3.71

0.96

(0.795)

(0.767)

(0.142)

(0.246)

(0.099)

(0.205)

(0.566)

(0.244)

(0.664)

0.27

-0.73

0.90

-0.68

-1.17

-0.56

0.47

0.88

0.27

(0.538)

(0.887)

(0.308)

(0.823)

(0.231)

(0.725)

(0.607)

(0.631)

(0.515)

32/31

28/35

33/30

30/33

27/36

30/33

34/29

35/28

33/30

(1.000)

(0.450)

(0.801)

(0.801)

(0.314)

(0.801)

(0.615)

(0.450)

(0.801)

Statistics:
Mean:
Parametric t-test (p-value):
Median:
Sign Rank Test (p-value):
Positive/Negative:
Binomial Sign Test (p-value):

Discretionary long term accruals are obtained by subtracting discretionary current accruals from discretionary total accruals.
Discretionary total accruals are computed as prediction errors from modified Jones (1991) model:

⎛ ∆REV j ,t ⎞
⎛ PPE j ,t ⎞
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎟ + b2 ⎜
⎟ + ε j ,t
⎟ + b1 ⎜
= a⎜
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜ TA
⎟
TA j ,t −1
j
,
t
1
j
,
t
1
j
,
t
1
−
−
−
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠
⎝
⎠
firm j’s change in working capital excluding cash and short term debt from quarter t-1 to quarter t minus
depreciation for quarter t,
firm j’s total assets at the beginning of quarter t,
firm j’s change in revenues between quarter t-1 and quarter t.
firm j’s gross value of property, plant and equipment in quarter t,
Error term for firm j in quarter t.
TACC j ,t

TACC j,t

=

TAj,t-1
∆REVj,t
PPEj,t

=
=
=
=

εj,t

Discretionary long-term accruals are reported as percentages of book value of total assets at the beginning of the quarter. All
p-values reported are for a two tailed test. Values significant at the 10% level are reported in bold face.
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-82impact on the accruals of event firms. Recalls almost always involve a change in
certain accruals. More specifically, recalls have a direct effect on certain working
capital accounts, even when there is neither any change in other economic conditions
(as captured by a change in sales) nor any attempt by managers to manipulate earnings.
For instance, it is typical for recalling firms to write-off defective inventory, to
write-off receivables against the recalled product or to record a current liability for the
expected refunds. All of these accruals (or changes in non-cash working capital
accounts) associated with recalls are, by their very nature, income-decreasing. Insofar
as the expectations model used to detect earnings management fails to control for the
effect on accruals arising exclusively because of the recall itself, it would systematically
overestimate expected accruals. Hence, such a model would be biased toward rejecting
the null hypothesis in favor of income-decreasing earnings management.
Another way of looking at this problem is to appreciate the difference between
‘abnormal’ accruals and ‘discretionary’ accruals. There are changes in non-cash
working capital accounts (i.e., current accruals) that are inextricably tied to recalls that
would be considered ‘abnormal’ for any non-recalling firm. But since they arise in the
natural course of a recall event, without any ‘purposeful intervention’ from the
management, they cannot be regarded as ‘discretionary accruals’ or taken as evidence of
earnings management. If the model used to detect earnings management does not
adequately account for ‘abnormal’ (but non-discretionary) accruals intrinsically
associated with recalls, it would misinterpret all ‘abnormal’ accruals as ‘discretionary’
and would tend to detect downward earnings management even when none exists.

-83The Jones (1991) model suffers from this weakness, at least in the context of an
event like product recalls. Regressors in the model fail to control for ‘abnormal’
accruals associated with recall that may not necessarily be ‘discretionary’. These
abnormal accruals that are unexplained by variation in right-hand side variables in the
modified Jones (1991) model are invariably negative or income-decreasing in case of
product recalls. The predicted or non-discretionary accruals from the modified Jones
(1991) model are overstated for the recalling firms to the extent that the model fails to
adjust the predicted accruals downward for anomaly in accruals attributable to product
recall. These overstated non-discretionary or predicted accruals, when subtracted from
the actual accruals of recalling firms, result in understated discretionary accruals or
prediction errors. This weakness in the expectations model would bias the test of
earnings management in favor of detecting income-decreasing earnings management, at
least in the quarter of recall. Therefore, there is a possibility that the significantly
negative accruals that we detected in the quarter of recall are attributable to the model
misspecification error discussed above.
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) also indicate this potential weakness of the
Jones (1991) model. They show that most aggregate accruals models (including the
Jones model) are likely to suffer from misspecification when applied to firms with
extreme financial performance. Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) assert that existing
aggregate accrual models reject the null hypothesis of no earnings management at rates
exceeding acceptable levels in cases where the event related to the incentive is
correlated with performance. Since our partitioning variable (i.e., product recall

-84announcements) is likely to be related to performance, the misspecification problem
may be a source of concern in our case too. With these revelations, the results shown in
preceding section come under a shade of doubt.
V. E. PROPOSED MODIFICATION TO THE EXPECTATIONS MODEL AND
ITS RATIONALE
In order to mitigate misspecification concerns and to check the robustness of our
results, we propose a modification in the model which would make the model wellspecified by controlling for the accruals inherently linked to recalls. We propose adding
the cost of goods sold as an additional regressor in the current accruals model. The
reason behind this proposition is rooted in the typical accounting treatment awarded to
costs associated with recall. Recalling firms charge the expenses or losses associated
with the recall to the cost of manufacturing the product. Therefore, the write-offs and
liabilities booked as a result of recall are all reflected in the cost of goods sold rather
than sales36. Thus, the abnormal but non-discretionary accruals (on the left hand side of
the expectations model) associated with recalls would be accounted for by a change in
cost of goods sold (on the right hand side of the model). The remaining unexplained
accruals or prediction errors are thus likely to capture the discretionary accruals more
accurately.
36

Under U.S. GAAP, firms are required to recognize both an expense and a liability for
a contingent liability that is probable and estimable. For most firms and industries this
condition applies in case of product recalls. Therefore, many firms make an explicit provision
for the recalls. To the extent the recalls follow the estimates set against them, they would not
have any material impact on either expenses or liabilities. However, the type of recalls that we
analyze in our study may not be covered by these provisions as indicated in the financial
statements of recall quarters that typically allude to a charge taken to account for the recall.

-85Generally, variation in the cost of goods sold mimics the change in sales and is,
therefore, justifiably considered superfluous as an additional explanatory variable in
earnings management models. But in the cases of recalling firms, movements in the
cost of goods sold account offer additional information about recalls-specific accruals
that is not captured by change in sales. Therefore, adding the cost of goods sold not
only provides better control for abnormal accruals associated with recalls, it also
improves the explanatory power of the model considerably.
V. F. NEW MODEL RESULTS
Table 9 reports the summary statistics for our proposed model. The fact that the
absolute value of average t-statistic for the newly added variable (i.e., cost of sales) is
quite high in the quarter of recall as well as in immediately adjacent quarters vouches
for the contribution of the cost of sales as an additional explanatory variable. The
average coefficients for change in revenues and change in cost of sales have the
expected signs.
Descriptive statistics for discretionary current accruals under the new model are
reported in Table 10 along with the p-values of the tests for significance. As somewhat
expected, the significance of negative discretionary current accruals in the recall quarter
fell down.
Under the original modified Jones (1991) model, the recall quarter discretionary
accruals were significant at the 5% level under all three tests conducted. However,
under the new model, none of the test statistics are significant at the 5% level. On the
basis of the parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test, the
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Table 9.

The change in cost of goods sold is added as an additional regressor to the expected
current accruals model based on the modified Jones (1991) model:
CACC

j ,t

TA j ,t −1

CACC j,t
TAj,t-1
∆REVj,t
∆CGSj,t

εj,t
Quarter:
a
t-statistic
b1
t-statistic
b2
t-statistic
N

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆ REV j ,t
⎟ + b1 ⎜
= a⎜
⎜ TA
⎟
⎜
j , t −1 ⎠
⎝
⎝ TA j ,t −1

⎞
⎛ ∆ CGS j ,t
⎟ + b2 ⎜
⎟
⎜
⎠
⎝ TA j ,t −1

⎞
⎟ + ε j ,t
⎟
⎠

= firm j’s change in working capital excluding cash and short term
debt from quarter t-1 to quarter t minus depreciation for quarter t,
= firm j’s total assets at the beginning of quarter t,
= firm j’s change in revenues between quarter t-1 and quarter t,
= firm j’s change in cost of sales between quarter t-1 and quarter t,
= Error term for firm j in quarter t.

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

-0.013

0.044

-0.034

0.024

-0.005

-0.004

-0.014

0.018

0.007

(0.209)

(0.310)

(0.131)

(0.158)

(0.109)

(0.195)

(0.122)

(0.155)

(0.144)

-2.234

1.026

-8.005

-0.758

1.853

-0.311

-0.972

-1.207

-5.363

14.927

39.127

21.239

12.957

22.859

19.029

16.770

27.808

37.318

0.434

0.407

0.049

0.307

0.337

0.324

0.469

0.152

0.188

(0.812)

(1.169)

(1.493)

(0.832)

(1.039)

(0.592)

(0.950)

(0.776)

(1.364)

3.135

4.816

2.102

5.185

2.825

4.747

3.773

1.039

1.132

(4.430) (20.508) (5.770) (20.777) (12.002) (20.295) (9.619)

(7.221) (21.595)

-0.264

-0.271

-0.001

-0.230

-0.331

-0.224

-0.281

-0.102

-0.041

(0.934)

(1.305)

(1.023)

(0.918)

(1.005)

(0.750)

(0.994)

(0.822)

(1.255)

-1.956

-2.184

-0.999

-2.493

-1.989

-2.006

-1.166

-0.141

4.508

(5.183)

(5.972)

(5.334)

(9.367)

(5.842)

(6.904)

(6.570) (10.954) (27.064)

318.51

322.29

324.19

325.37

326.85

327.86

329.49

331.33

331.02

(175.35) (176.70) (177.42) (178.14) (180.44) (182.35) (183.40) (184.48) (185.16)

R

2

Adj. R2

0.279

0.337

0.312

0.292

0.288

0.346

0.362

0.347

0.381

(0.253)

(0.295)

(0.305)

(0.289)

(0.259)

(0.306)

(0.308)

(0.315)

(0.317)

0.268

0.327

0.302

0.280

0.276

0.337

0.352

0.337

0.371

(0.256)

(0.298)

(0.310)

(0.293)

(0.263)

(0.309)

(0.312)

(0.319)

(0.322)

Means and standard deviations (in parenthesis) are reported for model coefficients and
goodness of fit statistics for each quarter covered by the analysis

Table 10: Discretionary Current Accruals around Recalls Based on the Current Accruals Version of the Modified Jones
(1991) Model with Cost of Goods Sold as an Additional Regressor
Quarter:

-4

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

4

-0.97

1.02

-0.35

1.86

-1.36

1.27

0.37

0.74

-1.00

(0.305)

(0.101)

(0.598)

(0.022)

(0.097)

(0.046)

(0.535)

(0.255)

(0.244)

-0.13

0.00

0.68

1.31

-0.72

1.01

0.11

0.47

-0.75

(0.922)

(0.162)

(0.874)

(0.011)

(0.055)

(0.049)

(0.627)

(0.072)

(0.133)

37/39

38/38

42/34

47/30

33/44

48/30

41/36

48/30

33/44

(0.909)

(1.000)

(0.422)

(0.068)

(0.254)

(0.054)

(0.649)

(0.054)

(0.254)

Statistics:
Mean:
Parametric t-test (p-value):
Median:
Sign Rank Test (p-value):
Positive/Negative:
Binomial Sign Test (p-value):

Change in the cost of goods sold is added as an additional regressor to the expected current accruals model based on the
modified Jones (1991) model. Discretionary current accruals for firms announcing product recalls are calculated as prediction
errors from the model:
⎛ 1 ⎞
⎛ ∆REV j,t ⎞
⎛ ∆CGS j ,t ⎞
CACC j ,t
⎟ + b2 ⎜
⎟ + ε j,t
⎟ + b1 ⎜
= a⎜
⎜ TA
⎜ TA
⎜ TA
⎟
⎟
⎟
TA j ,t −1
j ,t −1 ⎠
j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝
⎝ j ,t −1 ⎠
⎝
CACC j,t = firm j’s change in working capital excluding cash and short term debt from quarter t-1 to quarter t minus
depreciation for quarter t,
= firm j’s total assets at the beginning of quarter t,
TAj,t-1
= firm j’s change in revenues between quarter t-1 and quarter t,
∆REVj,t
∆CGSj,t = firm j’s change in cost of sales between quarter t-1 and quarter t,
εj,t
= Error term.
Discretionary current accruals are reported as percentage of the book value of total assets at the beginning of the quarter. All
p-values reported here are for a two tailed test. Values significant at the 10% level are reported in bold face.
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-88discretionary current accruals in the quarter of recall are significantly negative at the
10% level. These results weaken our earlier findings that firms engage in incomedecreasing earnings management in the quarter of recall without completely wiping it
off. There are still traces of downward earnings management in the recall quarter, at
least on the part of some firms. The fact that both the mean and median are negative
and significant at the 10% level along with the finding that the binomial sign test
statistic is not significant suggests that although the sign of discretionary accruals is
relatively evenly distributed (33 positive versus 44 negative), the magnitude or rank
sum of the negative discretionary accruals far outweighs that of the positive ones.
Stated differently, many firms may not be resorting to income-decreasing earnings
management in the quarter of recall, but the ones that are doing so are engaging in more
intense downward management of accrual – a trend that is consistent with the big bath
hypothesis.
There can be an alternate explanation for the erosion in the significance of
negative discretionary accruals in the recall quarter under the new model. While
movements in the cost of sales are expected to do a good job in explaining the changes
in working capital accounts initially arising from the recall accounting, it cannot
account for reversals of the changes that take place within the recall quarter. For
instance, a liability is recorded for the expected refunds or repairs on account product
recall in the quarter in which the recall is announced. This change in current liability (or
current accrual) would be accounted for by a change in the cost of goods sold on the
right hand side of the model. But when this liability reverses (i.e., refunds and repairs

-89actually take place soon after the recall is announced), it would result in incomeincreasing accruals that would not be controlled for by any of the regressors even in the
new model. To the extent that the product recall liability reverses in the recall quarter,
it would tend to offset the negative discretionary accruals arising due to downward
earnings management thereby diluting the significance of income-decreasing earnings
management found in the recall quarter. The expected refund or repair liability
recognized in the quarter of recall is likely to reverse mostly in the recall quarter and in
quarters immediately after the recall quarter37.
Now we turn our attention to another noticeable change in results under the new
model as exhibited in Table 10. Interestingly, the discretionary current accruals in the
quarters around recall which previously were not significant for most part became
significant under the new model. In the quarters immediately preceding and following
the quarter of recall (i.e., quarters -1 and +1), mean and median discretionary current
accruals are positive and statistically significant. In the quarter preceding the recall, the
mean (p-value for parametric t-statistic) of discretionary current accruals changes from
+1.08 (0.103) under the previous model to +1.86 (0.022) under the new model. The
median (signed rank test p-value) of the discretionary current accruals changes from

37

Response to the recall announcement is usually high initially as the announcement
appears all over in the media. But as time passes, the response rate falls rapidly. In fact, as we
browsed over the financial statements of some of the recalling firms we noticed that some of
them wrote-off the product recall liability after sometime citing high attrition in recall response
rate. This is consistent with the Consumer Reports (August 2004) article quoted in footnote 9
that almost one-third of all vehicles subject to recall; more than half of toys, clothes, appliances,
tools, and electronics gear; and three-fourths of child car seats remain on the road or in the
home.

-90+0.70 (0.100) to 1.31 (0.011). Thus both the mean and median discretionary accruals
become significant at the 5% level in quarter -1.
Similarly, in quarter +1, the median, which was previously insignificant,
becomes significantly positive at the 5% level. Thus, for the quarter preceding the
recall announcement as well as the quarter following it, discretionary current accruals
are positive and significant. This evidence is consistent with the smoothing hypothesis
discussed earlier. Managers driven by various contracting and capital market incentives
tend to smooth earnings and try to meet analyst expectations. Here it appears that
product recall charges taken in the announcement quarter are large enough to make it
difficult for managers to smooth the earnings in that particular quarter. Therefore, in
these quarters managers prefer to take a ‘big bath’. This behavior is in line with the
theoretical framework developed by Kirschenheiter and Melumad (2002) and empirical
studies summarized in section II C. In a fiscal period where a particular bad news item
makes the prospect of reaching the expectational target rather grim, managers resort to
under-reporting earnings even further in order to create hidden reserves that can be used
to enhance future earnings.
But in other quarters around recall, managers quickly revert to their job of
downplaying the effect of bad news and attempt to mitigate the slump in their financial
performance by means of income-increasing earnings management. It seems from the
data that managers tend to manage earnings downward in the quarter of recall as they
can attribute bad performance to the charges arising from recall and attempt to undo this

-91effect by managing earnings upward in quarters before and after the recall quarter so
that the fiscal year earnings expectation can still be met.
However, caution must be exercised in interpreting the significant and positive
discretionary accruals in quarter +1 as upward earnings management. There is another
possibility that may explain significantly positive discretionary current accruals in the
quarter subsequent to the recall quarter. As mentioned earlier, product recall liability
set aside for refunds and repairs reverses in the quarter of recall and in the following
quarters. A part of this liability is expected to reverse in quarter +1. Therefore, there is
a possibility that the significantly positive discretionary accruals in quarter +1 are in
part due to reversal of product recall liability.
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the entire positive significance of discretionary
accruals in quarter +1 can be explained by a reversal of accrual liability for two reasons.
First, if this were the case, then one would have observed a pattern of significant
positive accruals in the remaining quarters after the recall as well. But there is no such
indication in quarter +2 discretionary accruals, and by quarter + 4, the discretionary
accruals become negative, although they remain insignificant. Second, discretionary
accruals in the quarter preceding the recall quarter are also positive and significant,
which cannot be attributed to product recall liability reversal. A pattern of positive and
significant current discretionary accruals in quarters before and after the recall is
suggestive of earnings management by recalling firms.
Overall, the results from our new model provide support for the smoothing
hypothesis or income-increasing earnings management around recalls. Specifically, we
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have significant and positive discretionary current accruals (the type of accruals most
susceptible to manipulation from management). These significantly positive
discretionary current accruals are indicative of managers’ attempts to ‘window dress’ or
paint a prettier picture of firms’ performances which is affected by recalls.
There is also weak evidence that recalling firms engage in income-decreasing
earnings management in the quarter in which the recall is announced. This tendency is
consistent with the big bath behavior. Under the big bath hypothesis, firms make the
most of the bad news by overstating their losses in an attempt to clean-up their balance
sheets and create hidden reserves which can be used to artificially inflate the earnings in
future periods.
On the whole our findings are indicative of a managerial tendency to smooth
earnings and meet earnings targets when those targets are within reachable limits and to
under-report earnings and take a ‘big bath’ when a ‘sufficiently’ bad news item makes
the target look unattainable or otherwise provide a scapegoat for bad performance.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Mounting anecdotal as well as empirical evidence suggests that firms manage
earnings in response to pressures from capital market participants, among other things.
These pressures are even higher on the firms that face performance-related problems.
Product recalls are firm-specific events of significant economic consequence. Firms
recalling products are likely to miss earnings targets and suffer from negative stock
price reactions. Under these circumstances, firms (under pressure from capital market
participants and contracting parties) are likely to mitigate slumps in their financial
performances by resorting to earnings management. Do these firms use discretionary
accruals to paint better pictures of themselves around recalls? Our study attempts to
answer this question. We use non-automotive recall announcements from 1990 to 2003
and models based on the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model to answer this
question.
We find that firms have a tendency to manage earnings upward in the quarters
immediately preceding and following the quarter of recall, possibly to undo the adverse
effects of product recall on the earnings and stock prices. This tendency is signified in
the presence of significant and positive abnormal current accruals in these quarters. We
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-94also find evidence consistent with big bath behavior in the quarter of the recall
announcement. More specifically, we found the discretionary accruals to be significant
and negative in the quarter of recall. This finding is in line with the big bath theory in
the accounting literature and popular in the financial press that for sufficiently bad
news, firms prefer to overstate losses and understate earnings in order to enhance future
earnings.
This paper contributes to the earnings management literature by identifying an
economically important corporate event as a context in which managerial incentives to
manipulate earnings are relatively high. Further, this paper is one of the few attempts to
gauge earnings management tendencies of firms around an event of truly operating
nature. Most of the past earnings management studies explore earnings management
around financial events like seasoned equity offerings, mergers, and share repurchases.
However, events related to a firm’s operation are as likely to offer incentives to manage
earnings as other events. This paper attempts to fill a gap in the earnings management
literature.
Another unique contribution of this paper comes from its adaptation of an
expectations model to control for event-related changes in accruals which may not be
discretionary. The proposed model does a better job in isolating discretionary accruals
from abnormal changes in working capital accounts inextricably tied to recall events
and addresses the misspecification concern commonly raised against the Jones (1991)
model.

-95Finally, this paper documents the extent of earnings management prevalent
before, after, and in the quarter of product recall announcements. The findings have
implications for firms’ shareholders, regulators and other stakeholders.
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